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CRIMINOLOGY 
“I HEARD IT THROUGH THE 
GRAPEVINE”: A RANDOMIZED 
CONTROLLED TRIAL ON THE DIRECT 
AND VICARIOUS EFFECTS OF 
PREVENTATIVE SPECIFIC DETERRENCE 
INITIATIVES IN CRIMINAL NETWORKS 
BARAK ARIEL*, ASHLEY ENGLEFIELD‡ & JOHN 
DENLEY¥ 
A rich body of literature exists on deterrence, yet little is known about 
how deterrence messages are communicated through social networks.  This 
is an important gap in our understanding, because such communication gives 
rise to the possibility that social institutions can utilize the vicarious effect of 
the threat of punishment against one individual to reduce the rate of 
reoffending amongst their criminal associates.  To test this, we identified 
criminals with an extensive offending history (prolific offenders) and their 
co-offenders using social network analysis and then conducted a randomized 
controlled trial to measure the effect on both prolific offenders and their co-
offenders of delivering a “specific deterrence” message.  The treatment—
preemptive engagements with prolific offenders by a police officer offering 
both ‘carrots’ (desistance pathways) and ‘sticks’ (increased sanction 
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threat)—was applied to the prolific offenders, but not to their co-offenders.  
The outcomes suggest that a single officer–offender engagement leads to a 
crime suppression effect in all comparisons, with 21.3%, 11.0%, and 15.0% 
reductions for specific, vicarious, and total network deterrence effects, 
respectively.  The findings suggest that (a) social network analysis based on 
in-house police records can be used to cartographically understand social 
networks of offenders, with an aim of preventing crime; (b) deterrence 
messages promulgated by the police have the capacity to reduce crime 
beyond what was previously assumed, as the cascading of threats in co-
offending relationships carries a vicarious crime reduction impact; (c) unlike 
“reactive specific deterrence” (i.e., a threat of punishment following a 
specific and detected crime) which can have perverse effects on certain 
offenders, preventative specific deterrence is a promising crime policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How are messages communicated in networks of people?  When does a 
message become powerful enough to alter behavior?  To what extent does a 
message conveyed by Person A to Person B influence Person C?  The 
assumption across disciplines, including psychology, economics, sociology 
and public health policy, has been that emotions and behaviors are 
contagious, cascading between individuals or groups.1  Concepts like peer 
pressure, persuasion, or susceptibility have been used since Aristotle, yet 
identifying the causal influences of contagion in social networks has 
remained empirically elusive.  In part, singling out the effect of a sole 
message about behavior from the countless bits of information that are 
transmitted in social group interactions is difficult to describe, let alone to 
quantify within research settings.  Still, the evidence we do have seems to lay 
out an avenue for testing these concepts in controlled yet real-life settings.  
Recent studies published in both Science and Nature have shown how online 
messaging can alter real-life behavior—for instance voting behavior, 
consumerism, as well as emotional contagion.2  These type of studies, 
however, are rare. 
Can social institutions, such as the police, cascade messages to 
individuals that reduce their criminal propensity in such a manner that the 
crime control effects also reduce offending levels throughout their criminal 
networks?  This question becomes particularly pertinent when the ‘target 
population’ is explicitly reluctant to modify its behavior.  Some evidence 
suggests that text message nudges are effective in the cessation of smoking3 
 
 1 See, e.g., JOHN W. THIBAUT, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS (1959); Sigal G. 
Barsade, The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion and Its Influence on Group Behavior, 47 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 644, 646–48 (2002); Adam D.I. Kramer et al., Experimental Evidence of 
Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks. 111 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 
8788 (2014). 
 2 Robert M. Bond et al., A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political 
Mobilization, 489 NATURE 295 (2012); Damon Centola, The Spread of Behavior in an Online 
Social Network Experiment, 329 SCI. 1194 (2010); see also Kramer et al., supra note 1. 
 3 William Riley et al., Internet and Mobile Phone Text Messaging Intervention for College 
Smokers, 57 J. AM. COLL. HEALTH 245, 247–48 (2008). 
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or as reminders to take medications,4 but these are generally self-initiated 
behavioral modifications with some degree of self-motivation.  What is not 
known is whether such messages can become an effective instrument to 
modify behaviors involuntarily, particularly if the intended recipients are 
members of criminal groups or gangs that they are unwilling or unable to 
leave.  While influencing members of society to vote has been successful,5 
one might expect the social and personal costs of desisting from crime, 
quitting drugs, or managing anger to be substantially higher.  This research 
therefore utilized strong and robust messages in order to maximize the 
psychological impact on the individuals and groups involved, but in settings 
that are potentially challenging to change. 
Measurement of the contagion effect with quantifiable data on human 
behavior remains difficult when the research settings are outside of the 
laboratory environment.  Recent experimental studies have attempted to 
measure the causal effect of peer influence under field-controlled settings,6 
but there have only been a handful of these7 and none in criminology.  The 
lack of randomized controlled trials in this field is interesting by itself 
because, without proof of causal effect, the underlying foundations of living 
in groups and the fundamentals of communication require us to assume that 
messages are both conveyed and change behaviors.  As well-reasoned as 
these assumptions may be, a rigorous scientific exploration of these 
communication patterns in social networks of offenders is essential to 
provide evidence upon which informed policy decisions can be made. 
To address this challenge, we investigated one particular form of potent 
messages— proactive engagement by police officers with criminals with an 
extensive offending history (prolific offenders)—that carried the aim of 
preventing their delinquent behavior.  The police are in a position to convey 
a critical message to offenders: “stop committing crimes.”  They can do so 
by letting the subject know that the police have placed him or her under 
intensified surveillance.  The theory of deterrence predicts that offenders will 
reduce their criminal activity under these conditions, as it becomes too 
“risky” to commit crimes.  Some research (reviewed below) on specific 
deterrence—that is, when the state punishes or threatens to punish a 
particular offender in order to reduce the likelihood of his or her recidivism—
 
 4 Jennifer L. Matjasko et al., Applying Behavioral Economics to Public Health Policy: 
Illustrative Examples and Promising Directions, 50 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S13, S16 (2016). 
 5 See Bond et al., supra note 2, at 297–98. 
 6 E.g., Sinan Aral & Dylan Walker, Identifying Influential and Susceptible Members of 
Social Networks, 337 SCI. 337 (2012). 
 7 See James H. Fowler & Nicholas A. Christakis, Cooperative Behavior Cascades in 
Human Social Networks, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5334 (2010). 
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does exist, but has yielded conflicting recommendations.8  We want to revisit 
this approach by looking at preventative rather than reactive specific 
deterrence initiatives.  But we explicitly go beyond that and ask: can the 
deterrence message “travel” to other members of the criminal community?  
And if so, is it effective enough to deter these co-offenders from committing 
crimes?  More specifically, can this approach be done preventatively as a 
way of reducing criminality by those who are more likely to commit crimes, 
because they have committed them in the past but may not have necessarily 
committed a recent crime? 
We conducted a randomized controlled field trial in Sacramento, 
California, by assigning half of all prolific offenders known to the police into 
“preventative specific deterrence” and in turn measuring not only the effect 
of officer-offender interactions on the targeted criminal (Person B) but also 
the effect of the messages on his co-offenders (Person C) and even other 
members of the criminal network (Person N).  Crucially, the police did not 
engage with Person C or Person N, but we measured the criminal behavior 
of Person B, C, and N against the criminal behavior of the control persons. 
In order to build our theoretical argument, we combine several 
intertwined conceptual frameworks.  First, we discuss criminal networks 
more broadly and how this line of inquiry illustrates the relationship between 
group members, referred to hereafter as “nodes.”  Directly linked to this is 
the study of co-offending and criminal groups, which is a rather mature body 
of literature in the sociology of crime that dates back to the days of the 
Chicago School;9 however, we place a greater emphasis on the more recent 
evidence.  Second, we present the concept of dyad and group 
communications more specifically, and what the literature tells us about the 
ways in which messages are conveyed in social networks.  We then move on 
to discuss the specific type of messages we are interested in manipulating: 
“preventative specific deterrence.”  This type of intervention is meant to 
increase the perceived likelihood of the arrest of individual offenders as a 
result of increased sanction threats, but also to incorporate “turning point 
pathways” as well, as part and parcel of desistance.  This then leads us to 
discuss the idea of vicarious deterrence, as our focus is on the ways in which 
messages are delivered within social networks. 
We then go on to describe our research design; a field-randomized, 
controlled trial to test these theoretical hypotheses.  Directly linked to the 
theoretical components of our approach, the operationalization of the 
 
 8 See infra Section I.C. 
 9 E.g., CLIFFORD R. SHAW & MAURICE E. MOORE, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF A 
DELINQUENT CAREER 26–41 (1931); Marshall B. Clinard, The Process of Urbanization and 
Criminal Behavior, 48 AM. J. SOC. 202 (1942). 
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intervention included both carrots and sticks; a threat of increased 
surveillance, on the one hand, and a referral to assistance as a way out of 
crime, on the other.  Thus, we tested how a message from a formal social 
control apparatus (the police) travels informally in criminal networks.  We 
then discuss the results of this experiment and present the implications of the 
findings for both theory and practice. 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CRIMINAL NETWORKS AND CO-OFFENDING 
The literature on co-offending—that is, the committing of crime in 
dyads or larger groups —is one of the most evolved and mature areas of 
research in criminology.10  The term “co-offending” was introduced by 
Professor Reiss11 not too long ago, yet the scholastic enterprise on 
committing crimes in groups has existed for some time.12  Recent empirical 
 
 10 See, e.g., ALEX R. PIQUERO ET AL., KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINAL CAREER RESEARCH: NEW 
ANALYSES OF THE CAMBRIDGE STUDY IN DELINQUENT DEVELOPMENT 2 (2007); MARK WARR, 
COMPANIONS IN CRIME: THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT (2002); Martin A. 
Andersen & Marcus Felson, The Impact of Co-Offending, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 66 (2010); 
Peter J. Carrington, Group Crime in Canada, 44 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 277 (2002); Peter 
J. Carrington, Co-Offending and the Development of the Delinquent Career, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 
1295 (2009); Peter J. Carrington, & Sarah B. van Mastrigt, Co-Offending in Canada, England 
and the United States: A Cross-National Comparison, 14 GLOBAL CRIME 123 (2013); Joan 
McCord & Kevin P. Conway, Patterns of Juvenile Delinquency and Co-Offending, in 9 
ADVANCES  IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 15 (2002); Jean McGloin et al., Investigating the 
Stability of Co-Offending and Co-Offenders Among a Sample of Youthful Offenders, 46 
CRIMINOLOGY 155 (2008); Albert J. Reiss Jr., Co-Offending and Criminal Careers, 10 CRIME 
& JUST. 117 (1988); Albert J. Reiss Jr. & David P. Farrington, Advancing Knowledge About 
Co-Offending: Results from a Prospective Longitudinal Survey of London Males, 82 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 360 (1991); Jerzy Sarnecki, Delinquent Networks: Youth Co-Offending in 
Stockholm, in CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY (Alfred Blumstein & David Farrington 
eds., 2001); Sarah B. van Mastrigt & David P. Farrington, Co-Offending, Age, Gender and 
Crime Type: Implications for Criminal Justice Policy, 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 552 (2009); 
Sarah B. van Mastrigt & David P. Farrington, Prevalence and Characteristics of Co‐Offending 
Recruiters, 28 JUST. Q. 325 (2011). 
 11 Albert J. Reiss, Co-Offending and Criminal Careers, in 10 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A 
REVIEW OF RESEARCH (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1988). 
 12 E.g., SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE & EDITH ABBOTT, THE DELINQUENT CHILD AND THE 
HOME 33–35 (1912); RICHARD A. CLOWARD & LLOYD E. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND 
OPPORTUNITY, A THEORY OF DELINQUENT GANGS 150–59 (1966); ALBERT COHEN, 
DELINQUENT BOYS: THE CULTURE OF THE GANG 84 (1955); CLIFFORD R. SHAW & MAURICE E. 
MOORE, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF A DELINQUENT CAREER 26–41 (1931); CLIFFORD R. SHAW, 
& HENRY D. MCKAY, REPORT ON THE CAUSES OF CRIME, VOL. II (1931); EDWIN H. 
SUTHERLAND, A Sociological Theory of Criminal Behavior, in PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 
(4th ed., 1947). 
2019] "I HEARD IT THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE" 825 
evidence suggests co-offending is widespread.13  Co-offending is a broad 
term both in terms of group dynamics and the types of criminality that such 
groups engage in.  Previous research includes groups that can vary in size, 
ranging from two members14 to many dozens, including gangs, mafias, and 
organized crime groups15 often working together in furtherance of their 
criminal endeavors.  Further, while van Mastrigt and Farrington identified 
co-offending as particularly prevalent in relation to juvenile delinquency, 
robbery and burglary, most offenders—up to 56%16 and even 80%17—have 
committed a crime with others at a certain point of their careers.  Co-
offending can be a life-long partnership or a “one-off” association for a 
particular job, depending on the social capital involved18 or the opportunistic 
nature of the offense.19  The magnitude and stability of the co-offending 
network is related to a number of factors, but it has been shown that the 
amount of crime committed with others is more profound than by solo 
careerists, with larger groups generating more crimes and more serious harm 
to society.20 
It has been assumed across several lines of investigation that what sets 
co-offending apart from solo offending is a social process of association with 
other co-offenders or prospective co-offenders.21  For this (and other) 
reasons, co-offending can be contextualized as a learning process, coupled 
 
 13 See Peter J. Carrington, Co-offending, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2014). 
 14 E.g., Albert J. Reiss Jr., Co-Offending and Criminal Careers, 10 CRIME & JUST. 117 
(1988); WARR, supra note 10, at 31–36. 
 15 E.g., Malcolm W. Klein & Lois Y. Crawford, Groups, Gangs, and Cohesiveness, 4 J. 
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 63 (1967). 
 16 See Sarnecki, supra note 10. 
 17 McCord & Conway, supra note 10, at 15. 
 18 See Bill McCarthy & John Hagan, When Crime Pays: Capital, Competence, and 
Criminal Success, 79 SOC. FORCES 1035, 1053–54 (2001). 
 19 See Brendan Lantz & Robert Hutchison, Co-Offender Ties and the Criminal Career: 
The Relationship Between Co-Offender Group Structure and the Individual Offender, 52 J. 
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 658, 660 (2015); McGloin et al., supra note 10, at 179; Mark Warr, 
Organization and Instigation in Delinquent Groups, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 11, 27 (1996); see also 
Daniel S. Nagin et al., Deterrence, Criminal Opportunities, and Police, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 74 
(2015). 
 20 See Martin A. Andersen & Marcus Felson. The Impact of Co-Offending, 50 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 66, 67 (2010); Ashley Englefield & Barak Ariel, Searching for Influential 
Actors in Co-Offending Networks: The Recruiter, 5 INT’L J. SOC. SCI. STUD. 24, 36 (2017); 
Jean Marie McGloin & Alex R. Piquero, On the Relationship between Co-Offending Network 
Redundancy and Offending Versatility, 47 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 63, 77–79 (2010). 
 21 See generally CLOWARD & OHLIN, supra note 12; SUTHERLAND, supra note 12. 
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with differential association behaviors.22  This exchange of ideas, or transfer 
of knowledge, includes not only technical skills,23 but also the sharing of 
justifications, rationalizations, or normative affirmations that the crime 
should be committed.24  Consequently, the conditions in which this process 
of association takes place—that is, how a collective criminal mindset is 
established across the group—are of great interest to crime scholars.25  The 
prominent theories in this space are reviewed below. 
Frank Weerman’s social exchange theory is particularly pertinent. 26  It 
shows that co-offending is an interpersonal exchange of tangible and 
intangible goods, in which each offender has something to gain from the co-
operation of the other.27  Apart from relationships formed under duress and 
taking advantage of vulnerable people, crime is not very different from 
normative contractual arrangements, in the sense that parties co-operate in 
order to materialize a shared vision for preferential outcomes.28  Whatever 
the goods, the risks involved in securing the goods or the methods needed to 
achieve it, rational co-offenders enter these relationships with the notion of 
gaining and receiving benefits.29  Thus, co-offending can be seen as an 
explicit instrumental process.30 
 
 22 See generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 12; Ronald L. Akers et al., Social Learning and 
Deviant Behavior: A Specific Test of a General Theory, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 636 (1979); Albert 
Bandura, Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 
191 (1977). 
 23 See McGloin & Piquero, supra note 20, at 65–67. 
 24 See JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME: MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS IN DOING 
EVIL (1st ed. 1988); see generally MONICA BLUMENTHAL ET AL., JUSTIFYING VIOLENCE: 
ATTITUDES OF AMERICAN MEN (1972); Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of 
Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 664 (1957). 
 25 E.g., Sarnecki, supra note 10. 
 26  See Frank Weerman, Co-Offending as Social Exchange: Explaining Characteristics of 
Co-Offending, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 398, 404 (2003). 
 27 Id. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169, 176 (1968); Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke, Opportunities, Precipitators and 
Criminal Decisions: A Reply to Wortley’s Critique of Situational Crime Prevention, 16 CRIME 
PREVENTION STUD. 41, 50, 70 (2003); Pierre Tremblay, Searching for Suitable Co-Offenders, 
in 5 ROUTINE ACTIVITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE 17, 33–36 (2017); Weerman, supra note 26, at 
404. 
 30 See Leanne F. Alarid et al., Group and Solo Robberies: Do Accomplices Shape Criminal 
Form?, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 6 (2009); Bill McCarthy et al., Uncertainty, Cooperation, and 
Crime: Understanding the Decision to Co-Offend, 77 SOC. FORCES 155, 173–74 (1998). 
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In this respect, co-offending is a rational decision, especially since it is 
more prevalent in crime categories that require an accomplice.31  If there is 
no “functional advantage” for collaborating,32 co-offending is less likely to 
occur.  Some argue that this rational choice model is over-simplified,33 given 
the wider critique against rational choice and the extent to which we use 
heuristics or social selection effects34 to drive our behaviors.35  However, at 
least one aspect of rational choice theory36 can be agreed upon: the decision 
to co-offend is an instrumental decision to exchange.37  Even if other 
psychosocial dimensions play a part in the decision to commit crime with 
others, co-offending remains a utility-based, purposeful behavior for those 
who partake. 
Related to this line of research is “participation literature,” which 
suggests that agency is pivotal to participation in group activities and at the 
same time participation affects the agent; this means that participants learn 
to participate by participating.38  It is essentially a learning process whereby 
the members of the group enhance their own personal efficacy skills.39  In 
co-offending relationships, this has been referred to as the implicit aspects of 
 
 31 See Marie Skubak Tillyer & Rob Tillyer, Maybe I Should Do This Alone: A Comparison 
of Solo and Co-Offending Robbery Outcomes, 32 JUST. Q. 1064, 1080–81 (2015); see 
generally RICHARD T. WRIGHT & SCOTT H. DECKER, BURGLARS ON THE JOB: STREETLIFE AND 
RESIDENTIAL BREAK-INS (1994). 
 32 See generally Sarah B. van Mastrigt, Co-offending and Co-offender Selection, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF OFFENDER DECISION MAKING 340 (Wim Bernasco et al. eds., 2017). 
 33 E.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in UTILITY, PROBABILITY AND HUMAN DECISION MAKING 141 (Dirk Wendt & Charles 
Vlek eds., 1st ed. 1975). 
 34 See generally Sheldon Glueck & Eleanor Glueck, Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency, 2 
JUV. CT. JUDGES. 32 (1950); MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL 
THEORY OF CRIME (1990). 
 35 See id. 
 36 See generally R. V. G. Clarke & Marcus Felson, Routine Activity and Rational Choice, 
in 5 ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY (Ronald V. Clarke & Marcus Felson eds., 1st ed., 
2004). 
 37 See, e.g., Jean Marie McGloin & Zachary R. Rowan, A Threshold Model of Collective 
Crime, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 484, 485–86 (2015); Jean Marie McGloin & Kyle J. Thomas, 
Incentives for Collective Deviance: Group Size and Changes in Perceived Risk, Cost, and 
Reward, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 459 (2016); Weerman, supra note 26, at 404. 
 38 Phillip Boyle, Participation in Neighborhood Governance and Its Influence on Sense of 
Community, Capacity, and Legitimacy 34 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Colorado at Denver). 
 39 See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE 
RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1999); Miller McPherson, An Ecology of Affiliation, 48 
AM. SOC. REV. 519 (1983); Robert Putnam, Social Capital: Measurement and Consequences, 
2 CANADIAN J. POL’Y RES. 41 (2001). 
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the decision to co-offend,40 and these include “norm acquisition, modeling, 
tutelage, loyalty, fear of ridicule/sanction, status seeking, and peer 
pressure.”41  These concepts will immediately become critical when we 
discuss the circumstances in which group messages are communicated 
effectively. 
Professor Akers would have undoubtedly agreed that co-offending is an 
important mechanism through which criminal definitions, skills, and 
rationalizations are transmitted from more experienced to less-experienced 
offenders in criminal networks.42  Therefore, “involvement with recruiter co-
offenders early in one’s criminal career may provide particularly powerful 
learning opportunities in which one can directly observe and imitate the 
behaviors and values of more experienced teacher accomplices.”43  For 
example, criminal behavior is learned particularly through interactions with 
other individuals in a process of communication; the principal part of the 
learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal groups.44 
B. MESSAGES IN NETWORKS 
In order to assume that dealing with offenders will have an effect on 
their co-offenders, we must accept an inherent assumption that group 
communications take place in these human interactions.  These verbal (and 
nonverbal) communications are so fundamental and yet are taken for granted 
and often overlooked in research.  However, social network scholars as well 
as criminal co-offending researchers should not ignore dyad or small-group 
communications, because even the basic inquiries in this research space may 
teach us about how criminal networks form, under which conditions they 
persist and how they could potentially be dismantled through formal or 
informal social control mechanisms.45  Yet we know very little about how 
offenders interact with one another46 with whom they choose to interact in 
 
 40 See generally McGloin & Rowan, supra note 37, at 486. 
 41 Van Mastrigt, supra note 32, at 350. 
 42 See RONALD L. AKERS, SOCIAL LEARNING AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: A GENERAL THEORY 
OF CRIME AND DEVIANCE (2011). 
 43 Van Mastrigt & Farrington, supra note 10, at 329; see also Reiss Jr. & Farrington, supra 
note 10, at 365–66. 
 44 See Jean Marie McGloin & Holly Nguyen, It Was My Idea: Considering the Instigation 
of Co-Offending, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 463, 484–85 (2012); see also Warr, supra note 19, at 12–
17. 
 45 See generally Christopher J. Lennings et al., Grooming for Terror: The Internet and 
Young People, 17 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 424 (2010). 
 46 See generally DIEGO GAMBETTA, CODES OF THE UNDERWORLD: HOW CRIMINALS 
COMMUNICATE (2011). 
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order to offend—what Felson refers to as “offender convergence”47—and 
how “crime ideas” are developed outside solo acts of crimes.  Do co-
offending ideas progress over time; is co-offending crime more spontaneous 
in nature—as the phrase goes, “birds of a feather flock together”;or is it 
strictly based on the attractiveness of certain opportunities?48  How much 
planning takes place?  Who instigated whom?  What types of pressure 
messages are placed on which party?  The evidence in criminology is rather 
thin. 
To answer these questions, we can draw from the general literature on 
group communications.49  We can also draw inferences about criminal group 
communications from research on the cascade of online messages between 
peers,50 on how messages are transpired prior to social demonstrations,51 or 
on social influence and political mobilization.52  The health behavior change 
literature is also informative here, including a number of behavioral 
theories.53  A common thread that runs through all of this research has to do 
with how messages can be delivered effectively and in the most persuasive 
way.  For group communications to be sustainable and efficient, some level 
of interdependence is needed between the parties,54 and the group needs to 
 
 47 Marcus Felson, The Process of Co-Offending, in 16 CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES 149 
(Martha J. Smith & Derek B. Cornish eds., 2003). 
 48 See generally Alarid et al., supra note 30, at 6; Nagin et al., supra note 19. 
 49 Space limitations preclude a detailed dialogue of the intricacies and distinctions of each 
theory, but some reviews of the literature are useful. See generally NEW DIRECTIONS IN GROUP 
COMMUNICATION (Lawrence R. Frey ed., 2002); Dennis S. Gouran & Aubrey B. Fisher, The 
Function of Human Communication in the Formation, Maintenance and Performances of 
Small Groups, in HANDBOOK OF RHETORICAL AND COMMUNICATION THEORY 622 (Carroll C. 
Arnold & John Waite Bowers eds., 1984); John F. Cragan and David W. Wright. Small Group 
Communication Research of the 1980s: A Synthesis and Critique, 41 COMM. STUD. 212 
(1990). 
 50 E.g., Sandra Gonzales-Bailon et al., The Dynamics of Protest Recruitment through an 
Online Network, 1 SCI. REP. 197 (2011); Zi Yang et al., Tsinghua University, Presented Paper 
at the ACM Conference on Information and Knowledge Management: Understanding 
Retweeting Behaviors in Social Networks (October 2010). 
 51 E.g., Bernard Enjorlas et al., Social Media and Mobilization to Offline Demonstrations: 
Transcending Participatory Divides?, 15 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 890 (2013). 
 52 E.g., Bond et al., supra note 2. 
 53 E.g., EMERGING THEORIES IN HEALTH PROMOTION PRACTICE AND RESEARCH: 
STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH (Ralph J. DiClemente et al. eds., 1st ed. 2002); 
Karen Glanz & Marc D. Schwartz, Stress, Coping and Health Behavior, in HEALTH BEHAVIOR 
AND HEALTH EDUCATION 210 (Karen Glanz et al. eds., 2002); Paul Krebs et al., A Meta-
Analysis of Computer-Tailored Interventions for Health Behavior Change, 51 PREVENTIVE 
MED. 214 (2010). 
 54 See generally KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: SELECTED THEORETICAL 
PAPERS (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1951). 
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share some delinquent norms and beliefs about their effectiveness and 
appropriateness.55  Some level of shared identity is also required.56  
Collectively, these variables may speak to whether the network will be long-
standing or a special-purpose vehicle57 and the extent to which “crime 
chatter” develops into criminal actions (online social network chat rooms that 
promote crime are a case in point, such as human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation, drug markets, and illegal downloading of films).58  Yet again, 
the fundamental virtue of all networks is that a certain intimate level of 
communication and message transference is required. 
Offenders also communicate between themselves about the perceived 
risk of apprehension,59 cost avoidance,60 and whether targets are safe or 
risky.61  Offenders also discuss “crime ideas” with people they confide in and 
with whom they engage in criminal activity more freely than with others.62  
Co-offenders are likely to be more cautious together, as they are able to 
identify additional risk factors, and they tend to select more lucrative targets 
together than alone.63  The very choice of whom to co-offend with depends 
on the level of trust individuals accord to their potential accomplices,64 which 
is fundamentally based on communications with these potential accomplices.  
 
 55 See generally Fredric M. Jablin & Patricia Sias, Communication Behavior in 
Organizations-Communicative Competence, in THE NEW HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
COMMUNICATION: ADVANCES IN THEORY, RESEARCH AND METHODS (Fredric M. Jablin & 
Linda L. Putnam eds., 2004). 
 56 See generally ERNEST G. BORMANN, SMALL GROUP COMMUNICATION: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (3d ed. 1990). 
 57 See generally JOHN F. CRAGAN ET AL., COMMUNICATION IN SMALL GROUPS: THEORY, 
PROCESS, SKILLS (7th ed. 2009); Alex Bavelas, Communication Patterns in Task-Oriented 
Groups, 22 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC’Y AM. 725, 730 (1950). 
 58 See generally Gulia A. Capra et al., Current Scientific Research on Paedophilia: A 
Review, 20 J. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 17, 22–23 (2014); Dennis Howitt & Kerry Sheldon, The 
Role of Cognitive Distortions in Paedophilic Offending: Internet and Contact Offenders 
Compared, 13 PSYCH., CRIME & L. 469 (2007); Tejashree D. Datar & Richard Mislan, Purdue 
University, Presented Paper at the Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security 
and Law: Social Networking: A Boon to Criminals (May 19, 2010). 
 59 See infra note 77 and accompanying discussion. 
 60 See Martin Bouchard & Holly Nguyen, Is It Who You Know, or How Many That 
Counts? Criminal Networks and Cost Avoidance in a Sample of Young Offenders, 27 JUST. Q. 
130, 131, 151–52 (2010). 
 61 See Cornish & Clarke, supra note 29, at 57, 64. 
 62 See McCarthy et al., supra note 30, at 162. 
 63 See generally PAUL F. CROMWELL ET AL., BREAKING AND ENTERING: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC 
ANALYSIS OF BURGLARY (1991); Wim Bernasco, Co-Offending and the Choice of Target 
Areas in Burglary, 3 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 139 (2006); Serge 
Moscovici & Marisa Zavalloni, The Group as a Polarizer of Attitudes, 12 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 125 (1969). 
 64 See generally Tremblay, supra note 29, at 17. 
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Given the uncertainties about cooperating in criminal behavior, the need to 
efficiently communicate the costs and benefits of committing a crime is 
cardinal in co-offending relationships.  This is why offenders are able to 
understand the value of cooperation.  Translating this insight into action 
requires that offenders are willing to risk the trust that cooperation demands.  
Although criminal cooperation is frequently discouraged by the uncertainty 
involved , . . . networks . . . influence people’s willingness to co-offend.”65 
Consequently, Andrew V. Papachristos was accurate when he argued 
that “social bonding, cohesion and control, opportunity structures, diffusion, 
trust, and peer influence” convey the importance of an individual’s network 
on their decision to commit crimes.66  This may be the reason why co-
offending is more likely to take place in preexisting social networks and with 
childhood friends,67 unless an expert is required for co-offending.  In short, 
being in a group requires people to trust each other as much as possible and 
to communicate with one another regarding the risks and perils of the 
profession, or else, co-offending would not be possible. 
So far, we have discussed how offenders “carry” messages within social 
networks.  An important yet missing piece of the puzzle, however, is how 
offenders register, process, and then cascade messages that originate from 
external sources and pass on to other group members.  This issue can be 
contextualized more broadly as the ways in which formal and informal social 
structures interact.  Both of these systems (the police on the one hand and 
friendships on the other, for example) have the potential to significantly 
affect the nature of the community.68  Whereas formal social structures have 
established rules, centralized roles, and activities; informal social structures 
are often diffused (however, they do not have to be, such as with pyramid-
shaped organized crime groups) and less stringent about the rules of social 
 
 65 McCarthy, supra note 30, at 174. 
 66 Andrew V. Papachristos, The Coming of a Networked Criminology?, in MEASURING 
CRIME AND CRIMINALITY: ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 101, 103 (John MacDonald 
ed., 2011); see generally Andy Hochstetler, Opportunities and Decisions: Interactional 
Dynamics in Robbery and Burglary Groups, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 737 (2001); van Mastrigt, 
supra note 32. 
 67 See TRACEY BUDD ET AL., HOME OFFICE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND STATISTICS 
DIRECTORATE, OFFENDING IN ENGLAND AND WALES: FIRST RESULTS FROM THE 2003 CRIME 
AND JUSTICE SURVEY 61 (2005). 
 68 See John M. Bolland & Debra Moehle McCallum, Neighboring and Community 
Mobilization in High-Poverty Inner-City Neighborhoods, 38 URB. AFFAIRS R. 42, 56–60, 63–
64 (2002); see generally GLORIA J. GALANES ET AL., EFFECTIVE GROUP DISCUSSION: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE (11th ed. 2003); Melanie C. Green & Timothy C. Brock, Persuasiveness of 
Narratives, in PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL INSIGHTS AND PERSPECTIVES 117 (Melanie C. 
Green & Timothy C. Brock eds., 2d ed. 2005); Frances Cleaver, Paradoxes of Participation: 
Questioning Participatory Approaches to Development, 11 J. INT’L DEV. 597 (1999). 
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interactions.69  For our purpose—and as developed more fully by Donahue—
it is possible to view these two social structures as “externally imposed and 
internally generated, depending on the size of the community under 
examination.”70 
Offenders may communicate codes of behavior, the pros and cons of 
various tactics, the trustworthiness of certain group members, or the 
justification or rationalization for committing certain crimes71—all of which 
are internal to the norms and practices of the group—but they can also 
communicate sanction threats, the attractiveness of suitable targets, and the 
whereabouts of capable guardians.72  In this respect, ethnographic research 
on illegal drug markets is informative.  Adler shows how drug dealers utilize 
their network of colleagues and friends not only to establish their clientele 
portfolio, but also to communicate information about apprehension risk by 
both the police as well as rival dealers.73  Rafik A. Mohamed and Erik D. 
Fritsvold74 uncovered similar findings.  Alex Piquero and Raymond 
Paternoster added that drunk drivers estimate their own conviction and 
punishment probabilities through other drunk drivers’ experiences.75  Other 
studies have shown how messages about sanction threats, risks, and the 
potential to avoid punishment travel in groups.76  These “formal messages,” 
which are part and parcel of deterrence, are then cascaded within the 
 
 69 See Putnam, supra note 39, at 42; see generally ROLAND L. WARREN, THE COMMUNITY 
IN AMERICA (3d ed. 1978). 
 70 Patricia Ann Farrell Donahue, We, the Community: A Study of Participation, 
Community and Public Policy 31–32 (Nov. 11, 2013) (on file with author). 
 71 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 12, 77–80; see generally Sykes & Matza, supra note 12, 
at 664–65. 
 72 See Greg Pogarsky et al., Modeling Change in Perceptions About Sanction Threats: 
The Neglected Linkage in Deterrence Theory, 20 J. QUAN. CRIMINOLOGY 343, 360 (2004); see 
generally, e.g., PATRICIA A. ADLER, WHEELING AND DEALING: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF AN 
UPPER-LEVEL DRUG DEALING AND SMUGGLING COMMUNITY (2d ed. 1993); Barak Ariel & 
Henry Partridge, Predictable Policing: Measuring the Crime Control Benefits of Hotspots 
Policing at Bus Stops, 33 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 809, 811–12 (2017); Barak Ariel et 
al., “Soft” Policing at Hot Spots—Do Police Community Support Officers Work? A 
Randomized Controlled Trial, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 277 (2016). 
 73 ADLER, supra note 72. 
 74 RAFIK A. MOHAMED & ERIK D. FRITSVOLD, DORM ROOM DEALERS: DRUGS AND THE 
PRIVILEGES OF RACE AND CLASS (2010). 
 75 Alex Piquero & Raymond Paternoster, An Application of Stafford and Warr’s 
Reconceptualization of Deterrence to Drinking and Driving, 35 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 3 
(1998). 
 76 Pogarsky, supra note 72, at 360; Alicia H. Sitren & Brandon K. Applegate, Testing the 
Deterrent Effects of Personal and Vicarious Experience with Punishment and Punishment 
Avoidance, 28 DEVIANT BEHAV. 29 (2007). 
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offending group, and it is this social process that our research is most 
interested in. 
C. SPECIFIC DETERRENCE 
One major type of message that the state can transmit to offenders is the 
threat “do not offend or else.”  The direct and specific warning approach has 
been suggested to reduce crime, for those who are the target of these 
interventions, are what Enlightenment philosophers referred to as “specific 
deterrence” (as opposed to “general deterrence”) messages.77  Specific 
deterrence is efficient when the cost of crime outweighs the profits of crime 
and when the threat of punishment is perceived to be real, consequential, and 
probable (or carries “meaningful” dosages of certainty of apprehension, 
severity of punishment, and the celerity with which it is carried out).78 
Beyond theory, considerable research exists on the concept of 
deterrence more broadly and deterrence as administered by the police, 
although admittedly not all of the available evidence is sufficiently rigorous 
when it comes to measuring the effect of deterrence on behavior.79  There is 
no agreement in the literature that specific deterrence “works” as a 
mechanism of modifying behavior,80 and some research suggests that under 
certain conditions it can backfire.81  However, it is still generally the case that 
when appropriately applied, “perceived sanction risk is related to lower 
 
 77 See generally JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE (1975). 
 78 See Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence by a Criminologist for 
Economists, 5 ANN. REV. ECON. 83, 85–89 (2013); Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-
First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 205–16 (2013); see generally Travis C. Pratt & Jillian 
T. Turanovic, Celerity and Deterrence, in 23 DETERRENCE, CHOICE, AND CRIME: 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 187 (Daniel S. Nagin et al. eds., 2018). 
 79 See Anthony A. Braga & David L. Weisburd, The Effects of Focused Deterrence 
Strategies on Crime: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Evidence, 49 
J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 323, 347–48 (2012). 
 80 See, e.g., Travis C. Pratt et al., The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-
Analysis, in TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 367, 374 (Francis T. 
Cullen et al., eds., 2008); Francis T. Cullen et al., Prisons Do Not Reduce Recidivism: The 
High Cost of Ignoring Science, 91 PRISON J. 48S, 58S (Supp. 2011); see generally ANDREW 
VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF 
RECENT RESEARCH (1999). 
 81 See Anthony Petrosino et al., Scared Straight and Other Juvenile Awareness Programs 
for Preventing Juvenile Delinquency: A Systematic Review of the Randomized Experimental 
Evidence, 589 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 41, 52–55, 58 (2003). 
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offending,”82 so the concept nevertheless remains relevant for crime control 
theory and policy. 
Specific deterrence is a broad category and can take many forms.  While 
arrest might be the most popular manifestation of police-based specific 
deterrence interventions “against” criminals (at least in popular culture); 
most of the contact by police with suspected offenders, which can result in 
specific deterrence, does not result in arrest.83  In practice, such contact may 
refer to a threat of imprisonment or arrest, stop-and-frisk (without arrest), 
street checks, or alternative resolutions, which have gained tremendous 
popularity in places like England and Wales.84  The fact that so many specific 
deterrence approaches exist alludes to the fact that some specific deterrence 
approaches can be more effective than others.85  Given the heterogeneity of 
these interventions, we argue that an important distinction should be made 
between two types of specific deterrence, proactive and reactive, and this 
distinction is at the heart of our study. 
First, there is what we refer to as “reactive specific deterrence,” which 
follows a particular crime.86  Within this mechanism, the state reacts to a 
specific offense, and the threat of sanctions is then applied to a particular 
offender.87  The aim of reactive specific deterrence is to dissuade him or her 
from committing additional crimes, above and beyond the crime for which 
he or she was apprehended.88  For example, the Turning Point Diversion 
 
 82 Lieven Pauwels et al., Perceived Sanction Risk, Individual Propensity and Adolescent 
Offending: Assessing Key Findings from the Deterrence Literature in a Dutch Sample, 8 EUR. 
J. CRIMINOLOGY 386, 386 (2011). 
 83 See Barak Ariel & Justice Tankebe, Racial Stratification and Multiple Outcomes in 
Police Stops and Searches, 28 POLICING & SOC’Y 507, 521 (2018); Donald J. Black & Albert 
J. Reiss, Jr., Police Control of Juveniles, 35 AM. SOC. REV. 63, 65–66 (1970); Douglas A. 
Smith & Patrick R. Gartin, Specifying Specific Deterrence: The Influence of Arrest on Future 
Criminal Activity, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 94, 94–95 (1989); see generally ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET 
AL., CRIMINAL CAREERS AND “CAREER CRIMINALS” (1986); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON 
J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973). 
 84 See, e.g., Peter Neyroud, Out of Court Disposals Managed by the Police: A Review of 
the Evidence, NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF’S COUNCIL OF ENGLAND AND WALES (2018). 
[perma.cc/FP3F-6AR4] 
 85 See, e.g., David Weisburd et al., The Miracle of the Cells: An Experimental Study of 
Interventions to Increase Payment of Court-Ordered Financial Obligations, 7 CRIMINOLOGY 
& PUB. POL’Y 9, 27–31 (2008); see also Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather M. Harris, 
Increased Death Rates of Domestic Violence Victims from Arresting vs. Warning Suspects in 
the Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment (MilDVE), 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 
1, 2 (2015). 
 86 See David H. Bayley, The Complexities of 21st Century Policing, 10 POLICING: J. POL’Y 
& PRAC. 163, 164 (2016). 
 87 See id. 
 88 See id. 
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experiment by the West Midlands Police (U.K.) tested the premise that 
“offenders who have not previously been convicted at court, but whom the 
police would otherwise charge for prosecution, can be more cost-effectively 
dealt with by police-led offender management than by prosecution, subject 
to a certainty of prosecution in the event of reoffending or breaking an agreed 
‘contract’ about their conduct.”89  Here, the “Sword of Damocles” hangs over 
the neck of the offender,90 where all the arrestees selected for treatment had 
a rapid (within 72 hours) diagnosis meeting with a police officer, after which 
the officer offered the arrestees the option of not being prosecuted if they 
agreed to a “turning point contract,” in which the arrestees would be 
prosecuted if they breached conditions of the contract or reoffended within 
six months.91  Recidivism or contract breach would automatically trigger 
prosecution for the original offense and any subsequent offenses, which 
creates a constant threat of punishment and by implication the focused 
deterrence effect. 
Turning Points, however, was a reactive specific deterrence approach 
because the offender was already apprehended and arrested for a specific 
offence, and the desistance contract was in the context of that first offense.  
While promising and reflecting a wider and robust approach in 
criminology,92 these interventions follow a particular case (e.g., a specific 
crime).  A person or property had already been victimized.  We are interested 
in a more preventative approach; to contact prolific offenders for whom we 
have no evidence to link them to live cases and to deliver a proactive specific 
deterrence aimed at reducing their future offending. 
Inspiration is drawn from initiatives such as the “Pulling Levers” case 
outlined in Boston (Operation Ceasefire), which had the broad idea of 
increasing the “certainty, severity, and swiftness of sanctions” in a number 
 
 89 Peter Neyroud et al., Operation Turning Point: An Experiment in “Offender Desistance 
Policing”, UNIV. CAMBRIDGE INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY (2009) https://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/
global/docs/events/epb2012/operationturningpoint.pdf/view [perma.cc/W8KU-NNSQ]. 
 90 See Lawrence W. Sherman, Al Capone, the Sword of Damocles, and the Police–
Corrections Budget Ratio: Afterword to the Special Issue, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
195, 201 (2011). 
 91 Neyroud et al., supra note 89. 
 92 See, e.g., Anthony Petrosino et al., Formal System Processing of Juveniles: Effects on 
Delinquency, 9 CRIME PREVENTION RES. REV. 4 (2013); Heather Strang et al., Reducing the 
Harm of Intimate Partner Violence: Randomized Controlled Trial of the Hampshire 
Constabulary CARA Experiment, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. EVIDENCE-BASED POLICING 160 (2017); 
Heather Strang et al., Restorative Justice Conferencing (RJC) Using Face-to-Face Meetings 
of Offenders and Victims: Effects on Offender Recidivism and Victim Satisfaction. A 
Systematic Review, 12 CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVS. 3 (2013); David B. Wilson et al., Police-
Initiated Diversion for Youth to Prevent Future Delinquent Behavior: A Systematic Review, 
5 CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVS. 5 (2018). 
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of innovative ways, often by directly interacting with offenders and 
communicating clear incentives for compliance and consequences for 
criminal activity.93  An antecedent to a successful focused deterrence 
approach is that the target population realizes the police can increase the costs 
of crime through any legal means necessary.  The perception of effectiveness 
is a more important issue,94 and as the literature review above suggests, 
specific deterrence can only work when the delivering authority is indeed 
considered capable of materializing the threat and the consequences of 
noncompliance are real.95  Effective deterrence messages must be perceived 
as “credible threats,”96 delivered by an authority that is considered effective 
and who can materialize the threat (e.g., arrests) to “deter[] repeated 
criminality because people respond[] . . . to a subjective pleasure/pain 
calculus.”97  Again, however, the aim of the Pulling Levers program was 
primarily to carb down ongoing and intense spikes in violent crimes. 
D. DESISTANCE 
However, deterrence alone does not seem to be able to pull offenders 
out of a life of crime, certainly not in the long run.98  Instead, a mixture of 
sticks and carrots is necessary.  Effective crime control includes pathways of 
desistance for serious offenders.99  Previous research on U.K. initiatives such 
 
 93 Braga & Weisburd, supra note 79, at 327; see also Anthony A. Braga et al. Focused 
Deterrence Strategies and Crime Control: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis 
of the Empirical Evidence, 17 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 205 (2018); Anthony A. Braga et 
al., Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston’s 
Operation Ceasefire, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 195, 196–201 (2001); David M. Kennedy, 
Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 449, 451–53 (1997). For a critique of this approach, see Mike Rowe & Thomas F. 
Sogaard, ‘Playing the Man, Not the Ball’: Targeting Organised Criminals, Intelligence and 
the Problems with Pulling Levers, POLICING & SOC’Y 1 (2019). 
 94 See generally Pogarsky et al., supra note 72, at 366. 
 95 See Sherman, supra note 90, at 201. 
 96 Robert Jervis, Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 41 WORLD POL. 183, 200 
(1989). 
 97 Smith & Gartin, supra note 83, at 95; see generally JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introduction 
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 17 (John 
Bowring ed., 1962). 
 98 See, e.g., Mark W. Lipsey, What Do We Learn From 400 Research Studies on the 
Effectiveness of Treatment with Juvenile Delinquents, in WHAT WORKS: REDUCING 
REOFFENDING: GUIDELINES FROM RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 63, 67 (James McGuire ed., 1995). 
 99 See generally David M. Kennedy et al., Beyond Deterrence: Strategies of Focus and 
Fairness, in HANDBOOK OF CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY SAFETY 157 (Nick Tilley & 
Aiden Sidebottom eds., 2d ed. 2017). 
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as the Liverpool Desistance Study,100 the Sheffield Study,101 and the Bristol 
Integrated Offender Management Project102 provided valuable information 
on how law enforcement agencies can be agents of turning points.  Based on 
these experiences, it appears that when officers manage offenders through a 
focused deterrence method, recidivism can be minimized.  As the officer is 
acting as both the agent of change via desistance pathways and a tool of 
threat, this approach is arguably more promising than other channels of 
intervention.103 
E. VICARIOUS DETERRENCE 
Vicarious deterrence is the final piece of the theoretical framework that 
forms the basis of this research as it combines the three lines of research we 
depicted above—co-offending, dyad, or group communications and specific 
deterrence—together to create a multiplier effect.  As far as we can tell, Gibbs 
was the first to discuss this concept104 in the framework of capital 
punishment,105 but it was more formally introduced by Beyleveld: “Vicarious 
deterrence occurs when a deterrent effect is achieved by the sanction 
threatening, not the potential offender personally, but someone other than the 
potential offender.”106  Yet it was Stafford and Warr who solidified vicarious 
deterrence as a more grounded approach; they demonstrated that this process 
takes place when an offender calculates the certainty of apprehension based 
on the punishment (or avoidance thereof) of others in their networks.107  
Paternoster and Piquero extended this model by indicating that the 
 
 100 Shadd Maruna et al., Pygmalion in the Reintegration Process: Desistance from Crime 
through the Looking Glass, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 271 (2004); Shadd Maruna et al., The 
Liverpool Desistance Study and Probation Practice: Opening the Dialogue, 51 J. COMMUNITY 
& CRIM. JUST. 221 (2004). 
 101 Anthony Bottoms & Joanna Shapland, Steps Towards Desistance among Male Young 
Adult Recidivists, in ESCAPE ROUTES: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON LIFE AFTER 
PUNISHMENT 43 (Stephen Farrall et al. eds., 2011). 
 102 Andrew E. Williams & Barak Ariel, The Bristol Integrated Offender Management 
Scheme: A Pseudo-Experimental Test of Desistance Theory, 7 POLICING: J. POL’Y & PRACTICE 
123 (2012). 
 103 See Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional 
Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 297, 302–04 (2007). 
 104 Jack P. Gibbs, Preventive Effects of Capital Punishment Other Than Deterrence, 14 
CRIM. L. BULL. 34, 40–41 (1978). 
 105 See also Dane Archer et al., Homicide and the Death Penalty: A Cross-National Test 
of a Deterrence Hypothesis, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 991, 1004 (1983). 
 106 Deryck Beyleveld, Identifying, Explaining and Predicting Deterrence, 19 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 205, 213 (1979). 
 107 Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and Specific 
Deterrence, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 123, 124–27 (1993). 
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information an offender has about the criminal activity of their peers and how 
successful their crimes are heavily influences an offender’s judgment about 
the certainty of apprehension.108 
The concept of vicarious deterrence across social networks fits squarely 
within the ways formal social control messages are cascaded.  In this respect, 
we emphasize that there are different levels of vicariousness (i.e., the distance 
from the threatened/punished node in the network) and that we are most 
concerned about direct and immediate relationships between offenders (that 
is, one degree of separation only).  Mark Granovetter suggested that in social 
circumstances in which offenders face sanction threats, they are likely to be 
affected by the experiences of their peers.109  The relevance of trust in this 
equation has to do with the likelihood of the effect of vicarious deterrence to 
modify the behavior of the co-offenders.  Aili Malm et al. have found that 
vicarious deterrence within social networks outperforms traditional direct 
deterrence variables in an offender’s risk prediction; which leads to the 
assumption that between peers or colleagues, vicarious deterrence can carry 
tremendous potential in formal crime prevention initiatives.110  A similar 
argument was recently made by Anthony Braga, Robert Apel, and Brandon 
C. Welsh, where they refer to “spillover effects.”111  However, to our 
knowledge, a direct and controlled test of vicarious deterrence initiated by 
the state has not been conducted. 
II. THE SACRAMENTO EXPERIMENT 
Whom within these criminal networks should the state target with 
deterrence messages?  The first logical step is to go after the most prolific 
offenders: as they are what Lawrence R. Sherman referred to as the “power 
few,” the central actors in the network causing the most harm to society.112  
An offender arrested more often than others is likely to be a suitable target, 
 
 108 Alex Piquero & Raymond Paternoster, An Application of Stafford and Warr’s 
Reconceptualization of Deterrence to Drinking and Driving, 35 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 3 
(1998). 
 109 MARK GRANOVETTER, TOWARD A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF INCOME DIFFERENCES 
(1981); see also Bouchard & Nguyen, supra note 60, at 130–31, 152–53. 
 110 Aili Malm et al., More Structural Holes, More Risk? Network Structure and Risk 
Perception Among Marijuana Growers, 51 SOC. NETWORKS 127, 132 (2017) (finding that 
“network-based vicarious deterrence has a significant effect on perceived risk”). 
 111 Anthony A. Braga et al., The Spillover Effects of Focused Deterrence on Gang 
Violence, 37 EVALUATION REV. 314, 316 (2013). 
 112 Lawrence W. Sherman, The Power Few: Experimental Criminology and the Reduction 
of Harm, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 299, 318–19 (2007) (defining the “power few” 
and arguing that “big effects in experimental criminology do appear more likely” when 
resources are allocated to addressing the “power few”). 
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as one’s criminal history is a strong predictor of future criminal behavior.113  
In this sense, the state through its social control agents—the police, social 
workers, probation and parole officers, etc.—ought to compile a list of targets 
of the most serious offenders and apply a preventative specific deterrence 
intervention on them.114 
However, the list should go beyond the prolific nature of these 
offenders.  If “formal messages” are indeed cascaded within criminal 
networks, the state would benefit by targeting serious offenders who are these 
offenders’ criminal associates (or “co-offenders”).  Thus, the specific 
deterrence message will affect the target, but the formal message would have 
an informal effect vicariously as well.  In practical terms, the most direct 
manifestation of this relationship is where an offender is linked to a 
disproportionate number of co-offenders, compared to the overall population 
of offenders.  Moreover, it is likely that the target is someone within the 
network of esteemed respectability, trust or power, and the most 
straightforward assumption is age: a mature offender is more likely to pass 
on an effective communication within the social network. 
Using police records on arrests and charges,115 we were able to conduct 
a pretest-posttest randomized controlled field trial, in order to test the effect 
of preventative specific deterrence on prolific Sacramento offenders, which 
we referred to as “targets.”  We then were able to measure the vicarious 
deterrence effect of these interventions on co-offenders linked to these 
prolific targets, as well as on the “total network” in which these offenders 
operate.  Our methods were designed to test the effect of messages in criminal 
networks, whereby a “stop offending, or else! and here are ways for you to 
get help” message was delivered by a formal, social control apparatus (i.e., 
the police) and then cascaded informally within groups of offenders. 
 
 113 Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, On the Relationship of Past to Future 
Participation in Delinquency, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 163, 183 (1991) (concluding that the results 
from their study suggest that “prior involvement in illegal activity has a genuine behavioral 
impact on future involvement”). 
 114 See generally Gavin Dudfield et al., The “Power Curve” of Victim Harm: Targeting 
the Distribution of Crime Harm Index Values Across All Victims and Repeat Victims Over 1 
Year, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. EVIDENCE-BASED POLICING 38 (2017); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., 
Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Informal Control of Domestic 
Violence, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 680 (1992). 
 115 As correctly argued by Jean Marie McGloin et al., “official record data [do] not contain 
many theoretically relevant predictors of co-offending and co-offenders. Future research 
should attempt to collect a wide range of data to examine what constellation of individual, 
environmental, and situational variables are related to co-offending and co-offender patterns.” 
McGloin et al., supra note 10, at 179–80. We return to these observations when discussing the 
limitations of our study. 
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III. METHODS 
A. RESEARCH SETTINGS 
In conducting this study, we collaborated with the Sacramento Police 
Department (Sacramento P.D.).  There are approximately 1.5 million 
residents in the greater metropolitan area of Sacramento; in 2016, the 
metropolitan population was comprised of 11% African-Americans and 23% 
Hispanics, with 87% of the residents having a high school diploma.116  In 
terms of crime, there were about seven homicides, 242 robberies, and 812 
burglaries per 100,000 population.117  In the year before the experiment, 
approximately 100,000 individuals were arrested for a number of crimes 
committed in Sacramento, or  thirty-four per 1,000 residents.118 
B. PARTICIPANTS 
1. Criminal Networks in Sacramento 
Social network analysis is increasingly implemented in the study of 
criminal behavior, particularly in “big data” environments.119  Here, we used 
open-source software (Gephi) to create cartographic network maps.  This 
software allowed us to capture graphically the relationships between 
offenders and their co-offenders in ways that tabulated data formats cannot.  
The maps were created by computing the number of links that each offender 
had with other offenders (co-offenders).  We looked at the “betweenness” of 
these actors,120 which is a measure of the centrality of the actor in a network: 
this meant that each actor and the degree of betweenness were measured by 
their relative value from within the graph.  Every individual is represented 
 
 116 See QuickFacts Sacramento City, California; Sacramento County, California, UNITED 
STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/sacramentocitycalifo
rnia,sacramentocountycalifornia/INC110216 (last visited Sept. 9, 2019) [perma.cc/K5KF-H8
97]. 
 117 See Crime in the United States 2013 California Offenses Known to Law Enforcement, 




 118 See id. 
 119 E.g., Christian Frydensberg et al., Targeting the Most Harmful Co-Offenders in 
Denmark: A Social Network Analysis Approach, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. EVIDENCE-BASED POLICING 
21 (2019). 
 120 See generally Linton C. Freeman, A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on 
Betweenness, 40 SOCIOMETRY 35 (1977); M.E.J. Newman, A Measure of Betweenness 
Centrality Based on Random Walks, 27 SOC. NETWORKS 39 (2005). 
2019] "I HEARD IT THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE" 841 
by a circle, or node, and the size of each circle represents the number of 
connections, or edges, that each node has with other nodes.  Thus, the more 
an individual co-offends, the more nodes he or she is linked to (see 
Illustration 1).121 
 














Legend: large circles represent the target population, and the smaller circles connected with a 
line to the target population represent associates (co-offenders). 
 
Using this approach, we utilized the computerized list of virtually all 
known criminals who live in the Sacramento area and were arrested for any 
type of offense, from which eligible participants could be drawn.  No major 
inclusion restrictions were set in terms of ethnic, social, economic, or 
demographic variables.  While this approach may increase the heterogeneity 
of the sample,122 a wider range of eligible offenders should create a stratified 
sample of the offenders’ community, which in turn is more likely to increase 
the generalizability of this experiment.  At the same time, we included a few 
operational inclusion criteria, which were designed, as described below, to 
sit squarely within the potential theoretical contribution of our work, as well 
as in view of the practical considerations of running a field trial. 
 
 121 See generally John Denley & Barak Ariel, Whom Should We Target to Prevent? 
Analysis of Organized Crime in England Using Intelligence Records, 27 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. 
L. & CRIM. JUST. 13, 22 (2019). 
 122 See generally David Weisburd et al., Design Sensitivity in Criminal Justice 
Experiments, 17 CRIME & JUST. 337, 362–67 (1993) (explaining the effect heterogeneity has 
on the “statistical power of experimental studies”). 
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2. Prolific Offenders 
To be operationally defined as a “target” for the police intervention, an 
offender must have had a prolific criminal background,123 which we defined 
as having been arrested at least three times in the forty-eighty months prior 
to the experiment, at least once in the last two years, and at least once for a 
Part I crime.124  Given the type of data we had (police records), we naturally 
excluded offenders who were unknown to the police, meaning that offenders 
must have been arrested by Sacramento P.D. at least once to become eligible.  
Second, our upper bound threshold was restricted to three arrests, although 
this may not have been deemed “highly prolific” in other co-offending 
studies,125 because any tighter restriction would have excluded too many 
potential offenders.  It seemed unlikely that a California offender would have 
been arrested for a major crime three or more times and not be incarcerated 
for a long period of time, for example, under the “three strikes” law.126  Either 
way, our attempt was not to focus on high-volume criminals per se, but rather 
to address offenders that were likely to be persistent and by implication to 
take part in the offending community and communicate a message to their 
colleagues and peers. 
Another reason for selecting prolific offenders is theoretically driven: 
there is a distinction between them and novice or immature offenders.127  
Given the biological, psychological, and sociological disparities between 
persistent offenders and time-dependent juvenile offenders, and given the 
 
 123 See generally McGloin & Nguyen, supra note 44, at 465–68; see also Reiss, Jr. & 
Farrington, supra note 10. 
 124 In the United States, the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program divides offenses 
into two groups, Part I and Part II crimes. Each month, participating law enforcement agencies 
submit information on the number of Part I offenses that become known to them; those 
offenses cleared by arrest or exceptional means; and the age, sex, and race of persons arrested 
for each of the offenses. Contributors provide only arrest data for Part II offenses. 
Crime in the United States 2011 Offense Definitions, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION, (last visited Sept. 10, 2019) https://ucr.
fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/offense-definitions [perma.cc/EV8B-Y
JA8]. Part I crimes include the violent crimes of murder and non-negligent manslaughter, rape, 
robbery, and aggravated assault, the property crimes of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle 
theft, and arson. Id. 
 125 E.g., Peter J. Carrington, Co-Offending and the Development of the Delinquent Career, 
47 CRIMINOLOGY 1295, 1314 (2009). 
 126 See generally James A. Ardaiz, California’s Three Strikes Law: History, Expectations, 
Consequences, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2000); Elsa Y. Chen, Impacts of ‘Three Strikes and 
You’re Out’ on Crime Trends in California and throughout the United States, 24 J. CONTEMP. 
CRIM. JUST. 345 (2008). 
 127 See, e.g., Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial 
Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674 (1993). 
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idea that the police should target persistent criminal careerists;128 our aim was 
to directly tackle the criminal activity of experienced offenders.  
Furthermore, if the intervention is in a position to increase the sanction threat 
among prolific offenders, it is conceivable that the intervention will affect 
naïve offenders but not vice versa.129 
Second, a target must have had at least three links to other co-offenders.  
We assumed that in order to test the effect of messages in criminal networks, 
the targets must be offenders who do not act alone, or at least are usually in 
the business of reaching out to criminal associates.  Our approach was to look 
at co-offending networks according to arrest records: individuals who were 
arrested with other offenders.  This criterion does limit the population of 
interest, as it does not include occasions when co-offending takes place but 
only one of the offenders is arrested, due to either a lack of identification or 
evidence against the others.  A more efficient approach could have been 
contacting offenders and surveying them about their co-offending 
behavior.130  Intelligence records may have also achieved this goal more 
productively, as such records often contain additional information about links 
between criminals that does not directly relate to a specific arrest.  However, 
we had access to neither of these rich sources.  While this may limit the 
external validity of our findings, we needed to assume a priori that the 
cascading of messages in groups can happen with our group of offenders and 
the most direct measures of co-offending were these co-arrest records. 
3. Co-offenders 
As reviewed earlier, messages are conveyed more effectively when the 
conveyor is of respected status or a revered member of the network, which is 
often associated with the conveyor’s age.131  Therefore, we defined co-
offenders as offenders who were younger when compared to the targets.  “If 
the nature of the relationship ought to be somewhat similar to a pupil–mentor 
 
 128 See Wim Bernasco, Them Again? Same-Offender Involvement in Repeat and Near 
Repeat Burglaries, 5 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 411, 427–29 (2008); Susan E. Martin & Lawrence 
W. Sherman, Selective Apprehension: A Police Strategy for Repeat Offenders, 24 
CRIMINOLOGY 155, 156–57, 170 (1986). 
 129 See George S. Bridges & James A. Stone, Effects of Criminal Punishment on Perceived 
Threat of Punishment: Toward an Understanding of Specific Deterrence, 23 J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQ. 207, 230–31 (1986); but see Charles W. Thomas & Donna M. Bishop, The Effect of 
Formal and Informal Sanctions on Delinquency: A Longitudinal Comparison of Labeling and 
Deterrence Theories, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1222, 1241–42 (1984). 
 130 See, e.g., McGloin & Rowan, supra note 37. 
 131 See generally Paul Brantingham & Patricia Brantingham, Crime Pattern Theory, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIME ANALYSIS 78 (Richard Wortley & Lorraine 
Mazerolle eds., 2008). 
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affiliation for efficient messages to be cascaded in a network,”132 then we 
should first start by testing the vicarious effect on co-offending relationships 
for which we can assume that the conveyor of the message would be listened 
to.  We did not limit the age gap between the target and the co-offenders, as 
we found no theoretical basis for any particular age criterion; for instance, a 
persuasive 28-year-old prolific offender may have the capacity to convince 
an 18-year-old but also a 27-year-old first-time offender to do a “job” with 
them.  Likewise, having a rigid criterion (e.g., more than 3 years apart), 
would limit our capacity to look at co-offending patterns in juveniles.  
Overall, the age criterion may omit certain relationships or certain offenders, 
yet we believe this exclusion criterion was necessary in order to achieve 
maximum effectiveness under our experimental conditions.  Future research 
may choose to broaden the sample definition further, a point we will consider 
when discussing the implications of our findings. 
Second, we limited the sample populations to those in which each co-
offender was linked to one target only.  This criterion was necessary to 
prevent diffusion of treatments,133 where co-offenders in control conditions 
are influenced by their counterpart treatment targets and alter their behavior 
given the message applied to the target population, regardless of random 
allocation conditions.  Again, this limits the generalizability of the study, but 
it was nevertheless critical to avoid violations of the stable unit treatment 
value assumption (SUTVA), which requires that “the [potential outcome] 
observation on one unit should be unaffected by the particular assignment of 
treatments to the other units.”134 
 
 132 Englefield & Ariel, supra note 20, at 29–30. 
 133 See WILLIAM R. SHADISH ET AL., Construct Validity and External Validity, in 
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 
64, 81 (2002). 
 134 D. R. COX, PLANNING OF EXPERIMENTS 19 (1958). As more recently explained by Barak 
Ariel et al., Preventing Treatment Spillover Contamination in Criminological Field 
Experiments: The Case of Body-Worn Police Cameras, J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY (Nov. 
27, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-018-9344-4, “[s]pillovers in randomized trials 
corrupt the core counterfactual comparison of the experimental design. The spillovers can 
operate at different levels, bleeding from treatment to control, between different treatment 
groups, within statistical blocks or clusters or within individual treatment units . . . For 
example, when the threat of spillover comes from major interference of the treatment group 
treatments into the control group, it leads to contaminated control conditions; this challenges 
the desired counterfactual contrast between units that were exposed to the intervention and 
units that were not . . . . When spillover occurs, participants (or units) in the control group 
experience a direct or indirect treatment effect from the program. While not allocated to the 
experimental group, controls may experience a spillover from other individuals/units who 
were assigned to a treatment group. In the case of spillover from treatment to control, in which 
everyone gets some treatment, differences between the two groups are shrunk.” Id. (emphasis 
in original). 
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C. RANDOM ALLOCATION 
Given these exclusion criteria, 421 targets were eligible and were each 
randomly allocated into either treatment or control groups.  Using a 
computer-generated simple randomization syntax, 206 targets were assigned 
to the treatment group, and 215 were assigned to the control group.  Using 
social network analysis, we detected that the targets were linked to 2,005 
eligible co-offenders.  Consequently, our treatment group was linked to 1,014 
individuals, while the control group was linked to 991 individuals.  In total, 
we observed the criminal behavior of 2,436 offenders. 
We compared the two groups on key characteristics to verify that 
participants in both the target groups as well as the co-offending groups were 
comparable at baseline (Table 1).  Chi-square tests and t-tests (depending on 
the type of the distribution of these variables) indicated that none of the 
differences reached statistical significance at the 0.05 level.  These figures 
suggest that, at baseline, our groups are comparable on key indicators.  
Offenders were generally mature, at about thirty years old.  The number of 
prior arrests was similar in the experimental and control groups across the 
three layers of the proposed analysis (at the level of the targets, the level of 
the co-offenders, as well as overall, in the entire criminal network to which 
each offender belonged).  Our prolific offender targets had six arrests on 
average at baseline and nearly fourteen prior charges, or a mean of 0.30 
arrests and about 0.80 charges in the twelve months prior to random 
assignment.  The co-offenders were less experienced, with about half of the 
mean arrests and charges as well as total arrests and charges as the targets. 
D. TREATMENTS 
Our operationalization of specific deterrence included the following 
ingredients: field contacts were conducted with each target in the treatment 
group once during the experimental period (120 days).  Assignments of 
officers (see more below) were made based on geography, as Sacramento is 
a wide jurisdiction.  Patrol sergeants were assigned up to six targets per 
month.  In turn it was their responsibility to ensure that each of the six targets 
received a visit by a patrol officer in that month.  The following month, each 
patrol sergeant received a different group of six targets, for which it was their 
responsibility to ensure that each of the targets was visited.  This rotation of 
targets was used to reduce any risk of personal bias by officers against 
particular offenders, as well as to remove the interaction effect between 
officers and study outcomes because our aim was to test the policy, rather 
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than the application of the intervention.135  The list of targets was 
communicated to the sergeants on a monthly basis from the Crime Analysis 
Team, and sergeants were accountable for fidelity to treatment protocols.  If 
an offender was not presently available to interact with an officer, it was the 
responsibility of the sergeant to further inquire how to reach the target.  We 
explore this below in more detail. 
Officers that were assigned a contact were provided the identifying 
information of that target by the sergeant, including criminal history, 
available intelligence briefs, contact information, and any other relevant 
material that existed on police records about the individual (for example, if 
they were on probation or parole).  A method for documentation was put in 
place for targets that had been incarcerated, killed, or otherwise prevented 
from participating in the experiment. 
Each officer was tasked with conducting a face-to-face interaction with 
the targets.  The orders were to convey to the targets that they were now under 
increased police scrutiny and that there would be regular unannounced visits 
by the police.  The justification for the increased scrutiny was the target’s 
criminal behavior.  It was then up to the individual officer to use her personal 
skills to carry out a safe contact with the target, where the deterrence message 
and “pathways” messages were conveyed clearly and explicitly.  In this 
sense, we were cognizant that different officers have different approaches to 
criminals and communication skills.  Therefore, to accord some 
systematization to the application of the treatments across officers, a leaflet 
was handed to every participating target.136  Among other key messages, the 
leaflet informed the targets that given their 
history of offending[,] the Sacramento Police Department will be making regular visits 
to ensure that [the target is not] continuing to break the law. These visits will be random 
and unannounced. Any questions can be directed at the officer from whom [the target] 
received this card or the Sacramento Police Department. Resources for altering [his or 
her] pattern of offending can be located on the reverse side of this card.137 
By providing this information, the risk sanction threat was elevated in a 
systematic manner, but the pathways message was conveyed methodically as 
well.  Offenders were then invited to contact a telephone number where they 
could obtain information to help them stop committing crimes, including 
health, social, and other services. 
 
 135 For more on intention to treat models, see generally Lewis B. Sheiner & Donald B. 
Rubin, Intention-to-Treat Analysis and the Goals of Clinical Trials, 57 CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 6 (1995). 
 136 See Supplementary Materials A. 
 137 Id. 
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1. Vicarious Deterrence 
We stress that the co-offenders—both treatment and control 
participants—did not receive any additional police interventions as part of 
this experiment; only the “business as usual” interventions that they 
encountered through routine police activity.  If new crimes committed by co-
offenders were detected, whether they violated parole or probation 
conditions, Sacramento P.D. would intervene as they normally would.  
However, they were not subjugated to proactive targeting by the police as 
part of the experiment.  In fact, the list of co-offenders—in both the treatment 
and control groups—was not shared with sergeants or other field agents.  This 
was done to avoid any treatment crossover contamination, purposeful or 
otherwise.  The hypothesis was that the specific deterrence effect would 
vicariously affect the co-offenders, by way of informal communications 
without the need to engage with them directly. 
2. Total Network Effects 
Similar to the co-offending offenders, the entire criminal networks 
associated with the targets were not targeted with the focused deterrence 
intervention beyond the ordinary interpositions applied to offenders in 
Sacramento.  The hypothesis was that the messages would be further 
cascaded in these networks beyond the immediate environment of the target 
population and the co-offending population. 
3. Control conditions 
There were three layers of control conditions in this study.  First, there 
were target offenders who were similar to the treatment targets (given the 
random allocation; see Table 1), to which the focused deterrence effects 
could be compared.  Second, there were control conditions in the co-
offending group as well, where the vicarious deterrence effects could be 
compared under rigorous settings.  Notice that neither group of co-offenders 
(experimental or control) was directly treated by any police intervention, but 
the hypothesis was that the treatment co-offending group was affected by the 
administration of the messages in their respected target population, as 
opposed to the control co-offending group, in which neither the target nor the 
co-offenders were assigned to any message effects.  Finally, we compared 
the entire criminal network that treatment offenders were linked to with the 
entire criminal network that the control offenders were linked to.  These 
control settings enabled us to show the total network effects of the 
intervention and to observe the impact of the deterrence message across a 
wider community of criminals. 
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E. MEASURES 
A major difficulty in analyzing behavior in networks has always been 
its measurement.138  Further, how can scholars detect the effect of one 
message in a world filled with constant flows of information, nudges, and 
cues?  Consequently, how can we measure the outcome of the message if we 
are not entirely sure the message was even registered by the participant?  
Apart from participant observations or continuous self-reporting exercises, 
the options for direct observations are limited.  Incidentally, observations are 
not risk-free, as the presence of an observer, particularly in systematic 
observations, may have an effect on the observed party.  Therefore, assessing 
the extent to which, in what forms, and magnitude; a deterrent message from 
the police has travelled in the criminal network community can be 
challenging. 
Another issue was cost.  Given our research questions, a longitudinal 
survey of thousands of offenders that would result in satisfactory response 
rates—a methodological struggle by itself— and with enough waves to not 
risk telescoping or other memory biases would be very expensive.  The 
chaotic lives some prolific offenders have, the transient nature of others, 
illiteracy, communication skills, and language barriers are only some of the 
challenges we would face if a survey was administered.  In practice, the most 
concerning issue was the inability to reach the offenders to measure the 
treatment effect.  The operational risks are exacerbated when considering 
observations: a sample of 1,000 participants and only two data points (for 
example, immediately after the application of the intervention and another 
observation in a follow-up period) would require a team of research assistants 
that was outside the scope of this research. 
Surveys were also likely to contaminate our experiment.  A survey itself 
can become an intervention (not least by way of a nudge), which would 
reduce the external validity of our findings.139  This is particularly true for 
administering a survey to the control group: it would lead to an observer 
effect on a group that we hoped to keep as “clean” as possible.  Announcing 
to control participants that we are interested in the way messages affect their 
behavioral patterns could by itself lead to variations in their behavior.  They 
may, for example, have questioned how we were able to obtain their contact 
details, and ethically we would be obliged to inform them that such 
information was obtained from the police. 
 
 138 See generally MODELS AND METHODS IN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS (Peter J. 
Carrington et al. eds., 2005). 
 139 See Thea F. van de Mortel, Faking It: Social Desirability Response Bias in Self-Report 
Research, 25 AUSTL. J. ADVANCED NURSING 40, 41, 45–46 (2008). 
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In principle, surveys and observations allow researchers the scope of 
analyzing a privileged and rich set of variables, especially for scholars who 
are interested in decision-making processes.  Instead, we relied strictly on 
official statistics: arrests and charges for new offenses post random-
assignment.  These outcomes provide direct, reliable, and unmediated 
measures of the messages.  Once the intervention is put in place, we can then 
compare the average effect across all four “cells” of participants: treatment 
targets, control targets, treatment co-offenders, and control co-offenders, as 
well as through the entire network of offenders (Fig. 1).  As noted, we applied 
a pretest–posttest design, with measures taken before and after the 
experiment, with both left and right-censored data dimensions (e.g., same 
baseline and follow up period for all participants, annualized). 
 
Fig. 1: Illustration of Study Flow (Hypotheses, Measures and Random 
Assignment): 
 
Arrests.  These figures represent the counts of new arrests accrued by 
offenders within the follow-up period of twelve months post-random 
assignment.  An arrest event takes place when the offender is taken into 
custody by the police.  In order to reduce the potential risk of officers 
proactively engaging with the target offenders—that is, anything beyond the 
assigned treatment or “business as usual” in the form of responding to crimes 
that were committed by the offenders—we observed arrest counts associated 
with victim-generated events only.  In other words, we did not measure 
arrests following proactive policing, such as stop and account, crackdowns, 
or street stops.  Arrests associated with proactive policing may be entirely an 
artifact of the experiment, as the officers might now have a “special list” of 
offenders they would target.  We made an assumption that arrests following 
victim-generated calls for service are less susceptible to proactive policies 
and the likelihood of an arrest under no-treatment conditions is broadly 
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stochastic.  The decision to exclude street checks and stop-and-accounts 
obviously dilutes the potential magnitude of the effect but clears out some of 
the statistical noise associated with the experimenter effect. 
We measured these arrest counts separately at three levels.  First, we 
counted the number of arrests within the target populations: the offenders 
that were assigned to treatment conditions and the counterfactual conditions.  
This gave us a direct measure of recidivism in the context of specific 
deterrence.  Second, we measured the number of times co-offenders linked 
to the target populations were arrested during the experimental period.  We 
counted the number of arrests for both the co-offenders who were associated 
with the target population and for co-offenders linked to control targets.  This 
measure allowed us to assess vicarious deterrence effects as a result of the 
cascaded message delivered through the target population.  Third, we 
measured the number of arrests for the entire network of offenders, as 
discussed above.  Thus, the study demonstrated the extent to which the 
deterrent message travelled to other members of the offender population.  We 
referred to this as the Total Network Effect. 
Charges.  One arrest could lead to several charge counts.  For example, 
an offender might be arrested for a violent offense and charged for the 
aggravated assault.  However, the offender might also be carrying drugs and 
threatening the life of his victim.  In this scenario, the offender was only 
arrested once, and once in custody, a prosecutor from the District Attorney’s 
office would then decide the nature and scope of the charges against the 
offender — in this case, likely for three separate offenses, to which the 
offender will have to respond in due course in court. 
Thus, we observed these measures for all six comparisons: twice for the 
targets (specific deterrence effects in treatment versus control), twice for co-
offenders (vicarious deterrence effects in treatment versus control), and twice 
for the entire criminal network to which the targets were linked (treatment 
versus control). 
F. STATISTICAL PROCEDURE 
Our crime data is comprised of counts.  Our analyses incorporated six 
models—once across 421 total units (206 T and 215 C cases), then across 
2,005 units (1014 T and 991 C cases), and finally then 2,426 units (1,220 T 
and 1,206 C cases).  Three models were set to look at arrests, and then three 
models looked at charge data.  However, under all models, there was 
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suspicion of over-dispersion,140 as we often expect in criminology.141  We 
applied D. Wayne Osgood’s142 approach to fixing this problem by analyzing 
the data using a generalized linear model with an adjusted Poisson model.143  
In this procedure, an adjusted Poisson distribution is created using a Pearson 
Chi-Square Scale Parameter Method within the generalized linear model.  
This procedure corrects for over-dispersion in regression distributions, and 
by implication corrects the standard errors of the estimates.  The standard 
errors of the parameter estimates are multiplied by the square root of the new 
scale statistic, making the statistical tests more conservative. 
Group assignment (‘treatment’ [1]/’control’ [0]) was the predictor and 
a Pearson Scale parameter for the over-dispersion correction, with the base 
rates of each outcome variable taken from the twelve months that preceded 
the experiment and the outcome variable in the twelve months post-random 
assignment, all using a generalized linear model.  We present the estimated 
marginal means144 to report the mean responses for the treatment effect.  We 
repeated the analysis several times to account for the treatment effect on (a) 
targets, (b) co-offenders, and (c) the total network.  We conducted these 
analyses for both arrests and charges and present the 90% Wald confidence 
interval for the parameter.145 
We then observed the magnitude of the difference between treatment 
and control conditions using Cohen’s146 effect sizes and the corresponding 
 
 140 See generally A. Colin Cameron & Pravin K. Trivedi, Regression-Based Tests for 
Overdispersion in the Poisson Model, 46 J. ECONOMETRICS 347 (1990). 
 141 See, e.g., John M. MacDonald & Pamela K. Lattimore, Count Models in Criminology, 
in HANDBOOK OF QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 683, 687, 697 (Alex R. Piquero & David 
Weisburd eds., 2010). 
 142 D. Wayne Osgood, Poisson-Based Regression Analysis of Aggregate Crime Rates, 16 
J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 21 (2000). 
 143 We contemplated using a more generic negative binomial assumption. However, we 
have found that the most functional form of the variance was the adjusted Poisson regression 
model, as the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) was lower for the latter model. See Gideon 
Schwarz, Estimating the Dimension of a Model, 6 ANNALS OF STAT. 461 (1978); see generally 
Richard Berk & John M. MacDonald, Overdispersion and Poisson Regression, 24 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 269 (2008). For further methodological considerations of the 
two approaches and the model fitness in various circumstances, see P. MCCULLAGH & J.A. 
NELDER FRS, Generalized Linear Models, in 37 MONOGRAPHS ON STATISTICS AND APPLIED 
PROBABILITY 123–135 (2d ed. 1989). 
 144 For more on marginal means, see generally CHARLES E. MCCULLOCH ET AL., 
GENERALIZED, LINEAR, AND MIXED MODELS (2d ed. 2008). 
 145 For a justification for a 0.1 threshold, see generally Lawrence W. Sherman & David 
Weisburd, General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A Randomized, 
Controlled Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625, 637–38 (1995). 
 146 See generally Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 98 (1992). 
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95% confidence intervals as a measure of reliability of the estimation 
procedure.147  The data were inputted into Comprehensive Meta-Analysis 
2.0, which consisted of the estimated marginal means for (i) arrests and (ii) 
charges across all three comparison levels. 
G. STATISTICAL POWER 
As noted, 421 participants were used in the first layer of the experiment 
(focused deterrence) and 2,005 participants in the second layer (vicarious 
deterrence).  This created a study with sufficient statistical power for 
inference.  Statistical power was defined by Cohen as the probability of 
detecting a statistically significant outcome in an experiment, given the true 
difference between the treatment group and the control group.148  By using 
G*Power 3,149 we could estimate that the smaller group’s sample size was 
large enough to detect small effects150 in which the significance level is 0.05.  
The hypotheses are assumed to be unidirectional and the estimated power is 
0.80. 
IV. RESULTS 
A. BASELINE COMPARABILITY 
Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics, including information on the 
targets and their co-offenders, at their pretest values.  As shown, most 
offenders were approximately thirty-years-old at the time of the experiment.  
The targets were more experienced offenders than the co-offenders, with over 
six prior arrests compared to about 3.5 arrests, respectively.  The mean 
number of charges filed against the targets was about fourteen and less than 
half of that for the co-offenders.  These criminal records suggest that we 
could compare the direct effect of focused deterrence of generally prolific 
and experienced offenders, whereas the vicarious deterrence effect is applied 
on generally novel offenders, although none are particularly young of age.  
When we look at the entirety of each network, we see that the mean number 
of charges and arrests is closer to the co-offender means rather than the target 
means, which is expected given that for every target there are approximately 
 
 147 See generally MARK W. LIPSEY & DAVID B. WILSON, PRACTICAL META-ANALYSIS 
(Applied Soc. Research Method Series Vol. 49, Leonard Bickman & Debra J. Rog eds., 2001). 
 148 See generally JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES (2d ed. 1988). 
 149 See generally Franz Faul et al., G*Power 3: A Flexible Statistical Power Analysis 
Program for the Social, Behavioral, and Biomedical Sciences, 39 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 175 
(2007). 
 150 See generally COHEN, supra note 148. 
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five co-offenders.  Importantly, none of these between-group comparisons 
are statistically significant due to the random allocation of units into 
treatment and control conditions. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: 2,426 offenders in Sacramento – Treatment 
(T) and Control (C) Conditions 
 Targets Co-Offenders Entire Network 
 T C T C T C 
N 206 215 1,014 991 1,220 1,206 












Prior Arrests (n) 1,283 1,304 3,370 3,242 4,653 4,546 














Mean Prior Arrests 12 













Prior Charges (n) 2,870 3,271 6,659 6,634 9,529 9,905 














Mean Prior Charges 













N visits  128 0 -- -- 128 0 
Offenders visited 62.1% 0% -- -- 10.5% 0% 
Post Arrests^ (n) 156 188 460 464 616 652 














Post Charges^ (n) 396 524 988 1,080 1,384 1,604 














^ 12 months post-test; SD = standard deviation 
854 ARIEL, ENGLEFIELD & DENLEY [Vol. 109 
B. MAIN EFFECTS 
Table 1 provides the raw figures for the treatment and control group at 
post-test values.  First, we see that in terms of implementation, a large 
proportion of offenders were not reached by the police.  Reasons for dropout 
vary, but mainly dropout was due to inaccurate contact information held on 
file for the targets.  Police officers assigned to interact with the targets 
reported that many addresses were incorrect (e.g., the offender was no longer 
living at that address, or was not employed at the same establishment as the 
one recorded at the last known address), and no new contact information was 
available to pursue the contact further.  We return to these issues below, but 
note at this stage that such dropping out is not uncommon when dealing with 
offending populations.151  Overall, officers made 128 contacts with the 
targets (62.1%). 
In all comparisons post-random assignment, the treatment groups 
offended less than control conditions.  In terms of arrests, we show the 
percent change in the target populations was -12.6% relative to the control 
targets, -4.3% in the co-offending population relative to its controls, and -
7.4% for the entire network.  The rate of arrests per 1,000 offenders in the 
treatment group was 504.9, while the rate of arrests per 1,000 offenders in 
the control group was 540.1.  In terms of new charges, the percent changes 
were more pronounced, -21.3%, -11.0%, and -15.0% for the specific, 
vicarious, and total network deterrence effects, respectively.  Here, the rate 
of new charges per 1,000 offenders was 1,134.4 in the treatment group versus 
1,330.0 in the control. 
Table 2 lists the outcomes of our statistical model results under the three 
conditions: focused, vicarious, and total network effects.  The table provides 
the predictor values for the intercepts, the baseline values of the dependent 
variables and the treatment effect, and the standard errors (SE).  We also 
present the exponential parameter estimates and Wald confidence intervals 
(lower and upper bounds).  These inferential estimates mimic the story told 
by the descriptive statistics.  We have found a significant deterrence effect of 
the police intervention against prolific targets (β = -1.60, SE = .109; p ≤ .10), 
with the exponential predictor ranging between -28.7% and +1.9%.  While 
the effect on arrests for co-offenders was not statistically significant, it was 
nevertheless in the hypothesized direction (β = -.023, SE = .066; p ≥ .10), 
with Exp(β)=.978 [.90% CI .877, 1.089].  Overall, the total network effect is 
significant, with the coefficient ranging between -15.4% and +1.8% arrests 
 
 151 See Linda G. Mills et al., The Next Generation of Court-Mandated Domestic Violence 
Treatment: A Comparison Study of Batterer Intervention and Restorative Justice Programs, 
9 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 65, 74–75 (2013). 
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on average compared to control conditions.  One final observation is the 
overall significant effect of previous criminal background on future 
criminality, which was pronounced and expected.152 
 
Table 2: Focused Deterrence, Vicarious Deterrence and Total Network 
Effects: Post Random-Assignment Arrest Estimates (Poisson Model 
Coefficients) 
   90% Wald CI for Exp(B) 




Treatment  -.160* .109 .853 .713 1.019 
Prior arrests .362*** .059 1.436 1.303 1.582 





Treatment  -.023 .066 .978 .877 1.089 
Prior arrests .575*** .020 1.778 1.720 1.838 




Treatment  -.075* .056 .928 .846 1.018 
Prior arrests .543*** .019 1.721 1.668 1.776 
(intercept) -.838*** .042 .433 .404 .463 
* p≤ .10; **p≤ .05; ***p≤ .01     
 
Next, we show the results of our three models (targets, co-offenders, 
and then the entire network) in terms of charges filed (Table 3).  We detected 
significant treatment effects in all three models (β = -.221, SE = .067; β = -
.060, SE = .216; β = -.124, SE = .047, respectively).  The largest effect was 
detected in terms of specific deterrence, with a 19.8% reduction in charges 
(ranging between -28.1% and -10.5%), whereas the vicarious deterrence 
effect on co-offenders yielded a 12.8% reduction in charges (ranging 
between -12.5% and 10.3%).  We then show that the effect on the entire 
network resulted in 11.7% reduction in charges against the treatment network 
 
 152 See generally David P. Farrington, Developmental and Life-Course Criminology: Key 
Theoretical and Empirical Issues—The 2002 Sutherland Award Address, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 
221 (2003). 
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compared to the control network (ranging between -16.9% and -6.2%).  Table 
3 further shows that previous charges predict future charges as well. 
 
Table 3: Focused Deterrence, Vicarious Deterrence and Total Network 
Effects: Post Random-Assignment Charges Estimates (Poisson Model 
Coefficients) 
    90% Wald CI for Exp(B) 




Treatment  -.221*** .067 .802 .719 .895 
Prior 
charges .091*** .010 1.095 1.076 1.114 





Treatment  -.060* .044 .872 .875 1.103 
Prior 
charges .216*** .006 1.242 1.228 1.255 




Treatment  -.124*** .037 .883 .831 .938 
Prior 
charges .183*** .005 1.201 1.190 1.211 
(intercept) .093*** .027 1.097 1.049 1.147 
*p≤ .10; **p≤ .05; ***p≤ .01         
 
Using the estimated marginal means of these models, we provide a 
visual illustration of the differences between experimental and control groups 
in terms of arrests and then in terms of charges (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3).  Notice 
that these modest changes consider the baseline values of the outcome 
variables as well.  Using these means, we computed effect sizes using 
Cohen’s d.153  In terms of arrests, the magnitude of the effect is generally 
small (the effect size for targets is d=-0.142 [95% CI -0.093, 0.045], for co-
offenders d=-0.015 [95% CI -0.102, 0.073], and for the total network d=-
0.053 [95% CI -0.132, 0.027]).  The treatment effect size in terms of charges 
 
 153 See generally Jacob Cohen, A Power Primer, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 155 (1992). 
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is more pronounced, reaching small-to-medium magnitudes based on 
Cohen’s154 criteria (for targets d=-0.321 [95% CI -0.514, -0.129], for co-
offenders d=-0.059 [95% CI -0.147, 0.028], and for total network effects d=-
0.134 [95% CI -0.214, -0.054]). 
V. DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we argue that deterrence literature can be broadly 
compartmentalized into two types, and based on this approach we can extract 
the effective from the potentially ineffective specific deterrence 
approaches.155  We ought to differentiate between “preventative specific 
deterrence” and “reactive specific deterrence.”  Whereas reactive specific 
deterrence refers to those approaches that attempt to threaten and/or punish 
for a specific crime already (and recently) committed, preventative specific 
deterrence looks at offenders more broadly, attempting to persuade them not 
to recidivate using both carrots (desistance pathways) and sticks (increased 
surveillance).156  In our study, we focused on the former.  We then observed 
the cascaded effect across the social network of the target offenders by 
measuring the vicarious deterrence effects.  Given our findings, several key 
implications emerge in terms of theory, practice, and future research. 
A. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Communication is key to the human condition.  Yet we found limited 
guidance in the literature, not only on the nature of co-offending 
communications, but on the effect on crime of various types of messages 
within these settings.  Specifically, we found very little empirical evidence 
on how formal deterrence messages work in co-offending groups: how 
formal control messages are effective in the informal domain.  We still know 
very little, such as the ways in which messages are delivered most efficiently, 
how many social nodes in criminal networks deterrence messages reach, or 
who is the most influential actor in the network, which would trigger the most 
change due to the original message.  However, we now have some direct 
evidence about one messaging platform that seems to exert a behavioral 
adaption as a result of the message: “I will be watching you, and here are 
some ways for you to get help. Stop offending!” This missive led to a 
reduction in arrests and charges in what is otherwise a tough group to change: 
persistent offenders in their early 30s with a rich (and fairly recent) criminal 
history.  Arguably more important is the reduction in charges and new arrests 
 
 154 See COHEN, supra note 148. 
 155 See supra Section I.C.  
 156 See supra Section I.D.  
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of their co-offending partners: the targets then went on to communicate these 
messages to their co-offenders, and in turn the latter group recidivated less 
than their control counterparts. 
These findings have implications for understanding the mechanisms in 
which deterrence messages are transmitted in these social circumstances, 
even though we are only able to infer these processes from the behavioral 
modifications we observed as a result of our interventions.  We return to this 
limitation below, but what seems clear from the data is intuitive and logical, 
yet rare in scientific explorations: a single, manipulated, and identifiable 
independent message that affects a wider audience, beyond the person who 
was the target of a threat.  Criminologists have been writing about it for 
years,157 and there have been observational studies on vicarious deterrence,158 
yet direct observation of these effects was missing from the discourse.  The 
trial suggests that offenders are acutely aware of their environment and are 
specifically attuned to cues presented to them by their peers.  When social 
control agents deliver what influential actors in social networks perceive as 
a credible threat—i.e., a single message of increased scrutiny—other actors 
are affected by it; the effect is not just on cognitive awareness of risks and 
decision-making processes (which we did not observe), but on the behavioral 
outcomes (which we did observe).  Thus, while the psychosocial mechanisms 
of the message are less understood in this study, or what some sociologists 
refer to as the “black box” of experiments,159 we nevertheless show that 
deterrence messages are translated into actioned and measurable outcomes. 
That said, we are aware that the single message we refer to is more 
complex than a naïve “don’t offend” deterrent threat.  However, we argue 
that this treatment’s heterogeneity is not a study limitation.  The message was 
delivered by a wide range of officers, and by its very nature is susceptible to 
the influences of officers’ approaches, demeanor, level of engagement and 
attitudes.  More substantially, the deterrent message was delivered in 
conjunction with a desistance message with information to the offenders on 
how they could obtain help.  There may be an interaction effect between 
deterrence and desistance that is not fully explored in this paper.160  Yet we 
 
 157 See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster & Alex Piquero, Reconceptualizing Deterrence: An 
Empirical Test of Personal and Vicarious Experiences, 32 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 251 
(1995); Stafford & Warr, supra note 107. 
 158 See, e.g., Braga et al., supra note 111, at 314–15; Malm et al., supra note 110, at 127. 
 159 See generally Donald P. Green et al., Enough Already About “Black Box” 
Experiments: Studying Mediation Is More Difficult Than Most Scholars Suppose, 628 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 200 (2010). 
 160 See generally LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., OFFENDER-DESISTANCE POLICING AND 
THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES (2012). 
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do place more emphasis on the deterrent message because 100% of all 
participating offenders were assigned a visit by a uniformed officer who, 
through symbolism of authority and insignia and literal powers of the state,161 
threatened criminals.  The very nature of the contact with a power-holder is 
assumed to carry a deterrent message to offenders.162  On the other hand, we 
do not know the extent to which offenders took advantage of the offer to get 
help, a study limitation by its own merit.  We could assume that some 
offenders sought assistance for desistance, but we cannot characterize the 
scope of this treatment manipulation or how well officers emphasized this 
portion of the delivery.  To the point, the single message is not as simple as 
a 280-character message on Twitter.  It is, however, a single message in the 
sense that the study intervention consisted of a single interaction between an 
officer of the law and an offender with a pre-emptive, preventative aim.  We 
therefore conclude that a “don’t offend or else” conversation between an 
officer and an offender is a teachable moment that impacts not only the 
offender, but his partners in crime as well.163 
This conclusion, however, is more nuanced than the customary specific 
deterrence theorem postulated centuries ago, as well as the empirical 
developments in the last thirty years.164  The primary difference—and 
perhaps a reason why backfiring effects were detected for some previous 
specific deterrence initiatives—is the preventative rather than reactive 
measure taken “against” offenders.  We distinguished earlier between 
interventions that come as an antecedent to more crime (preventative) and 
interventions that follow a specific crime and are aimed to teach the offender 
a lesson that the crime for which s/he is punished is costly.  Yet the evidence 
is mixed at best165 or advises against the reactive specific deterrence approach 
altogether, at least in the punitive formalization it currently holds in the 
United States.166  It appears that specific deterrence can be risky because there 
is a subset of offenders that react adversely to attempts to threaten them.  
 
 161 See generally Justice Tankebe et al., A Multidimensional Model of Police Legitimacy: 
A Cross-Cultural Assessment, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 11 (2016). 
 162 See Ariel, et al., supra note 72, at 307. 
 163 See Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in 
Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 757–58 (2014). 
 164 See Pogarsky et al., supra note 72, at 346–47. 
 165 See Cullen et al., supra note 80, at 58S–61S. 
 166 See Mona Lynch, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary 
Society, 25 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 109, 111 (2002). 
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There is a wide range of reasons for this, including defiance,167 resistance168 
and alienation.169  Leaving aside the question of just deserts,170 from a 
utilitarian perspective it appears that reactive specific deterrence is 
inefficient.  On the other hand, preventative specific deterrence 
acknowledges that the offender is an offender by the virtue of his/her prolific 
criminal background, but the temporal sequence is flipped: there is a threat 
but no literal materialization of the sanction of the offender, which the law 
requires to be specific and bespoke to a certain criminal act.  The cost for 
past offending is increased scrutiny: The Sword of Damocles.171  The focus 
is not on a particular past behavior, but on an unwanted pattern that the police 
are looking to break. 
In this sense, our study illustrates the capacity of the state to act as a 
social control agent to reduce future offending of a targeted population, even 
without a particular offense in mind but with a pattern of offending.  
Deterrence and desistance scholars should be encouraged by these findings.  
First, we show that that preventative specific deterrence works beyond the 
targets to their social networks.  However crude and difficult to characterize 
the exact infrastructure in which these messages transpire and under which 
conditions these informal social contacts operate, the data suggest that a 
causal pathway exists in these deterrence contexts.  The object of 
preventative specific deterrence is a contagion element which passes through 
messages, from the formal social contact onto the informal social contacts; 
by doing so, it reduces criminal behavior across the entire network. 
We did not approach targets and their co-offenders with surveys to 
understand how these psychosocial mechanisms literally and latently 
operate.  Future research should look more closely at the human condition 
associated with these effects.  We can only speculate at this stage on how 
these messages operate: when the officer knocked on the door of the offender, 
the latter did not hold complete information about the reason for the contact 
made with her.  She did not know if the police had become aware of a 
particular crime she had committed or whether the officer held information 
about her involvement in ongoing future criminal endeavors, for example 
 
 167 See Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the 
Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 445, 448–49 (1993). 
 168 See Roni Factor et al., A Social Resistance Perspective for Delinquent Behaviour 
Among Non-Dominant Minority Groups, 53 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 784, 784–88 (2013). 
 169 See Hayden P. Smith & Robert M. Bohm, Beyond Anomie: Alienation and Crime, 16 
CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6–13 (2008). 
 170 See Anthony Bottoms, The Philosophy and Politics of Punishment and Sentencing, in 
THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM 17 (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan, eds., 1995). 
 171 See Sherman, supra note 90. 
2019] "I HEARD IT THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE" 861 
though the work of covert police agents or signals intelligence (SIGINT).  
Either way, the lack of information increased the risk portfolio and the 
decision may have been to lay low until the level of risk was reduced to more 
manageable levels. 
In our view, the abovementioned interpretation also explains why these 
interactions between the prolific offender and the officer had a spillover 
effect on the co-offenders.  Gabriel De Tarde defended the view that people 
adopt new behaviors and attitudes through symbolic interactions, where 
“ideas precede imitation of their expression.”172  For imitation to take place, 
people must first “perceive a person’s attitudes and behavior as salient, 
internalize the pattern and, especially, the meanings attached to the act, and 
then ‘decide’ whether the action fits with their own value-orientations, 
cherished norms, and self-interest.”173  We learn from particular individuals 
to which we are anchored, predominantly from those whom we come to 
consider significant others.174  This learning process occurs when ideas are 
“appropriated through interaction and evaluated based on the exposed 
person’s own social psychological disposition . . . even those ‘imposed’ from 
superiors involve a cognitive, moral/aesthetic, and/or affectual 
dimension”.175  Thus, if the “superior person” shares with his peers that an 
agent of the state paid him a visit with a credible deterrent threat, the peers 
respond by laying low as well. 
It should therefore become immediately clear why learning, imitation, 
and persuasion through a crime-mentorship relationship is more powerful 
than simple co-offending: criminogenic ideas are more likely to survive 
under these conditions.176  It has been repeatedly shown that co-offending 
relationships can shape the co-offenders’ subsequent criminal careers.177  
There also seems to be a greater likelihood for “criminogenic lifestyles” 
following co-offending.178  Drawing again from learning theories, if the 
prolific offender is idolized and his ideas are internalized by the co-offenders 
 
 172 GABRIEL TARDE, THE LAWS OF IMITATION 207 (Elsie Clews Parsons trans. 1903). 
 173 Seth Abrutyn & Anna S. Mueller, Reconsidering Durkheim’s Assessment of Tarde: 
Formalizing a Tardian Theory of Imitation, Contagion, and Suicide Suggestion, 29 SOC. F. 
698, 702–03 (2014). 
 174 See Arthur Aron & Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe, Including Others in the Self: Extensions 
to Own and Partner’s Group Memberships, in INDIVIDUAL SELF, RELATIONAL SELF, 
COLLECTIVE SELF 89 (Constantine Sedikides & Marilynn B. Brewer eds., 2001). 
 175 Abrutyn & Mueller, supra note 173, at 703. 
 176 See generally Englefield & Ariel, supra note 20. 
 177 E.g., Andersen & Felson, supra note 10, at 67; McGloin & Nguyen, supra note 44, at 
480–87; Carlo Morselli et al., Mentors and Criminal Achievement, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 17 
(2006). 
 178 See McGloin & Nguyen, supra note 44, at 484. 
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as legitimate, then a life of crime is more likely to persist.179  The target 
becomes a significant other.180  In this experiment, we suggest that the 
emulation can take the form of positive behavior as well: a reduction in 
criminal behavior.  Thus, the cascading of preventative specific deterrence 
messages in criminal networks provides a teachable event for the co-offender 
and by implication changes his behavior. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Policing scholars as well as desistance practitioners have argued that 
turning points enabled by a rule-enforcer can lead to reductions in crime; 
however, the evidence has been largely observational.  Empirical research 
and more specifically field experiments in this space are scarce, with some 
notable but rare exceptions.181  The findings thus provide policymakers with 
more substantiated evidence that preventative measures—i.e., preventative 
specific deterrence—have the capacity to reduce criminal behavior in the 
target population and their co-offenders.182  A key finding is that the police 
matter as preventative agents.  Much like place-based interventions,183 a 
focused and precautionary approach applied by the police to problems,184 
places,185 and individuals186 can have substantial albeit modest consequences 
in harm reduction. 
Beyond that, we see that formal messages are, on average, effective 
despite being delivered by a generally mixed group of officers.  Different 
frontline officers, in six different geographic districts were able to reduce the 
number of crimes committed by offenders.  This so-called treatment 
heterogeneity is important, because it suggests that the preventative specific 
deterrence is likely to be shaped, although not completely nullified, by 
 
 179 See Moffitt, supra note 127, at 686–88. 
 180 See, e.g., AKERS, supra note 42, at 254–85; Abrutyn & Mueller, supra note 173, at 701, 
703–04, 709–10. 
 181 See, e.g., Jonathan Goosey et al., Integrated Case Management of Repeated Intimate 
Partner Violence: A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. EVIDENCE-BASED 
POLICING 174, 187–88 (2017). 
 182 See Barak Ariel, Disrupting Organised-Crime Networks: An Evidence-Based 
Approach to Establishing Effective Interventions, in DISRUPTING ORGANISED CRIME: 
DEVELOPING THE EVIDENCE BASE TO UNDERSTAND EFFECTIVE ACTION 48 (Clare Ellis ed. 
2014). 
 183 See Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated 
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 635–37 (2014). 
 184 See Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A 
Randomized Controlled Trial, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 577, 580–82 (2008). 
 185 See Sherman & Weisburd, supra note 145, at 629–30. 
 186 See Braga & Weisburd, supra note 79, at 327–28. 
2019] "I HEARD IT THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE" 863 
environmental circumstances.  On average, the treatment effect was 
significant on both offenders and their co-offenders (at least in terms of 
charges), and throughout all measures, pointed to the same hypothesized 
direction of fewer crimes in the treatment groups compared to control groups.  
Put differently, the policy of preventative specific deterrence leads to 
reductions in crime notwithstanding the different ways of delivering the 
content of these messages. 
Finally, it ought to be stressed that the tested police intervention 
consisted of one contact.  On the one hand, there are great perils in applying 
a one-off intervention, especially in deterrence.  This is what Ariel referred 
to as a “toothless” policy because it might send a perverse message to the 
offender that the threat is hollow.187  The police officer is informing the 
offender that if she commits more crimes, then the officer will increase the 
certainty of apprehension.  Yet with one encounter, it is likely that the 
intervention will fade over time.  Residual deterrence depends on many 
factors, but at the very least it seems logical to assume that some follow-up 
is required to demonstrate to the offender that the threat is not in vain. 
On the other hand, our experiment was more modest: our aim was to 
illustrate under rigorous conditions the causal inference between a deterrent 
message and its direct and vicarious effects on criminal elements and their 
co-offenders.  A more comprehensive program can now be put in place with 
the acknowledgement that the one-off intervention is unlikely to survive or 
perhaps backfire.  It would be naïve to believe that one preventative specific 
deterrence message would, on average, stop crime, rather than reduce it 
compared to no-treatment conditions.  In practical terms, persistence is likely 
required to sustain the observed reduction.  However, any substantive new 
approach must start somewhere, and we suspect more developments will 
soon follow. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Beyond the need for more replications and different locations, there are 
analytical considerations upon which future studies should reflect.  First, 
would a bespoke team of officers who specialize in specific deterrence as a 
full-time role be more effective than front-line officers delivering deterrence 
messages alongside their day job?  It is likely that despite the additional costs, 
a bespoke team delivers more effective results in policing.  A bespoke team 
would also be able to run a more comprehensive offender management 
program (such as the Integrated Offender Management programs that have 
 
 187 Barak Ariel, Deterrence and Moral Persuasion Effects on Corporate Tax Compliance: 
Findings from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 39 (2012).  
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gained popularity in England and Wales in recent years).  Such a team can 
also deal with the one-off limitation we mentioned earlier by targeting the 
most harmful offenders in the police’s jurisdiction over several sessions.  The 
extent to which these assumptions are true should be a subject of future 
inquiries. 
Second, a closer look at the take-up rate of the desistance pathways will 
indicate under what conditions desistance is more likely to be achieved.  We 
currently do not have this information, as the data were not kept on these 
referrals, but it seems pertinent for future protocol-based impact evaluations. 
Finally, a more nuanced evaluation of the types of offenders and their 
co-offenders that are more susceptible to these messages is needed.  In this 
sense, research efforts should be devoted to looking at third-order 
relationships—i.e., the co-offenders of the co-offenders, and so on—and 
whether deterrence decays over these relationships.188 
D. ADDITIONAL STUDY LIMITATIONS 
There are several, key limitations of our study, which future research in 
this sphere should consider.  First, our use of official statistics to both define 
the criminal networks and to measure the behavioral changes due to the 
deterrent messages (in any of the studied groups) is limited to the knowledge 
held by the police.  Criminologists are aware of the lack of external validity 
that such records hold and the limited picture they depict about the crime 
problem and about offenders more broadly.189  We cannot fully defend 
against an argument emphasizing the missing links in our depiction of the 
criminal networks in Sacramento, including the unmasked co-offending 
associations not based on arrest records, how messages are transferred 
between the second, third, and nth node in the networks, and the extent to 
which deterrence threats are delivered through the grapevine.190  In short, 
relying strictly on police data on co-offending is reliable but not necessarily 
 
 188 See generally Sherman, supra note 113. 
 189 See Barak Ariel & M. Bland, Is Crime Rising or Falling? A Comparison of Two 
Methods: Police Recorded Crime and Victimization Surveys, in METHODS OF CRIMINOLOGY 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 7 (Mathieu Deflem & Derek M.D. Silva eds., 2019). 
 190 There is a utilitarian justification for using police records. The police, especially 
specialized units, are de facto the formal social institution to deal with criminal networks. 
Therefore, what they know, despite the criminological iceberg bias, represents the necessary 
conditions for the targeting of offenders. Our results suggest to the police that by implementing 
a proactive and preventative measure against prolific offenders, the benefits are far-reaching: 
not just against those whom they directly interact, but to their peers, colleagues and co-
offenders. While we would welcome a richer depiction of the criminal community and the 
links between its members, we are nevertheless able to provide evidence, however partial, on 
the effect of preventative specific deterrence as well as vicarious deterrence messages. 
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valid, so future research could benefit from self-reported data on co-
offending behavior. 
Our second methodological limitation is the potential for treatment 
spillover,191 which can potentially violate the stable unit treatment value 
assumption.192  We tried to reduce the diffusion of treatments by having each 
co-offender linked to one target only.  We admit, however, that messages 
may have been conveyed between co-offending relationships of which we 
were unaware (e.g., not based on co-arresting links), but there are no methods 
of controlling for these risks without more data.  This of course is linked to 
the broader limitations of our reliance on official statistics only.  However, 
we remain confident in our results, despite the potential for diffusion, as the 
risk it creates implicitly means that our Type I error threshold is more 
stringent: statistically significant differences emerged across most 
comparisons, despite the potential for undocumented spillover, and thus the 
magnitude of the treatment may potentially be even stronger in reality.  Still, 
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VI. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS  
A. FRONT SIDE OF LEAFLET 
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B. BACKSIDE OF LEAFLET 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
